

59. The main argument in support of such an approach arises from the control problem itself. To control conventional weapons or to control atomic weapons would require such wide powers, at least of inspection, that interference in national affairs and the opportunities for uncovering state secrets in uncontrolled fields would be approximately as great as if the whole range of armaments and armed forces were subject to control. The inspectors would still have to have power to go wherever they chose in order to discover activities in violation of the agreement. For this reason the control might as well be comprehensive in its coverages of war-making potential. The only room left for manoeuvre would, therefore, appear to be as regards the timing of control and the rights, functions and powers of the control organ itself.

60. Yet for years the Western Powers have maintained that no dilution of safeguards could be acceptable. This position has tended to harden, at least in the United States, with the new complications presented by Soviet stockpiling and by thermonuclear weapons which, in logic, must require more effective, rather than less effective, forms of international control. But a new approach might begin by examining what specific safeguards are necessary to ensure that nations would have adequate warning against a surprise attack, which is the greatest risk in the presence of nuclear weapons so long as there is no system for the international control of armaments.

61. From this tentative assessment of the problem, it may be that we are thrown back in our conclusions upon reliance on mutual deterrence as the only realistic policy. The capacity — present or future — of each side to destroy the other is unquestionably of the greatest importance in preventing war. If it makes war too horrible to contemplate, the deterrent may even lead to disarmament, or at least to serious negotiations. But the risks and limitations of relying on mutual deterrence have already been examined in this paper; at best it can only be a policy *faute de mieux*.

62. If our policy may be described as “deterrence if necessary but disarmament if possible”, the search for a new approach to disarmament might embrace not only an effort to rethink the control problem but some consideration of the following factors which may be listed on the more hopeful side of the ledger:

(a) the problems posed by the new weapons are unprecedented; we must, therefore, not discard, on the basis of past performance alone, solutions which seem to be required by the facts; for example, we should not abandon altogether our attempts to negotiate a control system because any real control appears contrary to the Soviet system — their leaders face an unprecedented situation too;

(b) we have at present reached an approximate balance of military forces and this balance is likely to be maintained at least until the saturation point is reached when each side would have the capacity to deal the other a mortal blow at any time and no surprise attack would succeed in warding off retaliation in kind;

(c) there are some who believe that when the saturation point is reached, thermonuclear weapons will, in all probability, never be used, at least against centres of mass population, even in the event of a major war; this expectation is not officially shared in NATO and could not be entertained without greatly weakening the value of the deterrent; this does not mean, however, that some tacit self-denying ordinance of this kind is out of the question, now or in the future;

(d) although a completely effective back checking of past nuclear production is no longer possible, and we must assume that *any* control system would fail to discover significant quantities of fissile material and weapons, it should be possible to control the means of delivery; as part of a comprehensive system of disarmament, forces on both sides would be