

has almost universally expressed a disapprobation of the continuance of the embargo, and has begun to shew symptoms of a determination not to endure it much longer.

The government and party in power unequivocally express their resolution not to remove the embargo, except by substituting war measures against both belligerents, unless that either or both should relax their restrictions upon neutral commerce.

Upon this subject some important communications have been made to me by Mr. Madison, and several of the members of this government, which I will accordingly lay before you, as I confidently believe they were delivered from an unfeigned desire that they might produce the effect of leading, if possible, to some adjustment of their differences with Great Britain, so as to enable the government and the nation to extricate themselves from the present very distressing dilemma in which they are involved.

Mr. Madison expressed his firm conviction that when the documents referred to in the president's message should be seen by his majesty's government, and the correspondences between their minister in France with the French minister respecting the decrees of Berlin and Milan should be deliberately considered; particularly the strong remonstrance of Mr. Armstrong to the French government, of the 12th Nov. 1807, that it would be acknowledged that the United States had exerted all the efforts which remonstrances could have been supposed to be capable of producing, and that in failure of any effect from them, in persuading the French government to withdraw their unjust restrictions upon neutral commerce, recourse might have been had by the United States, to measures of more activity and decision against France; but that in the mean time time Great Britain had issued her orders in council, before it was known whether the United States would acquiesce in the aggressions of France, and thereby rendered it impossible to distinguish between the conduct of the