

"I am now more impressed than ever with the need for seizing every opportunity that might lead to a satisfactory early settlement with Japan... it is clear that the Japanese have fulfilled pretty well the requirements that have been imposed upon them by the occupation and it seems to me that from here on we must give them some incentive to maintain and strengthen the democratic way of life and to wish to maintain close and friendly relations with the Western world. I suggest our security lies in this as much as in keeping them disarmed... Perhaps this prolonged occupation period will have served a purpose in enabling us to acquire a better perspective on the type of peace treaty we should make with Japan, which will, we hope, be a lasting one; one that should be realistic but not one that would be bitterly opposed as unjust by the Japanese people. We know the damage to peace and security that such a punitive peace treaty can cause."

I have devoted considerable time to filling in the background to the San Francisco meeting because that background is important. I think it is important that you realize that the meeting was the last act of a long series of acts which had gradually brought agreement on the terms of the Japanese Treaty. Months of discussion at San Francisco would not have made the treaty a better one. There comes a time in negotiations between sovereign states when a maximum agreement is reached. It may not be, in fact it is not likely to be, one hundred percent agreement but it is the best which can be achieved. It is then that action must be taken on the subject under consideration if action is ever to be taken. As I listened to each of the delegates at San Francisco I was impressed with the desire of all (but those representing Communist regimes) to get on with action for peace. The time for talking of peace had passed. Adequate opportunities for discussion of the terms of the treaty had been given over the period of a year to the countries represented. It was heartening to be at the meeting and to see an overwhelming number of nations of the free world support that action for peace and ignore the threats of the Soviet delegate.

The Conference met in the San Francisco Opera House where six years before, in the flush of victory, the war-time Allies brought the United Nations into being. It played to a full house, and yet the delegates were aware of regrettable absences. Neither India nor Burma had accepted the invitation to the Conference. Each had exercised its sovereign right to disagree, an action which in itself gave the lie to Communist charges that this was a rigged conference of the type they are such experts in arranging. It is interesting to note however, as one delegate did, that these two countries, India and Burma, gave opposite reasons for their non-attendance. In the one case it was based on the belief that the treaty was too restrictive and in the other on the belief that the treaty was too liberal in its terms. The sponsors of the treaty claimed only that much for the treaty -- that it followed the middle way.

One other regrettable absence was that of China. On this point all delegates were agreed. The part played by the Chinese people in resisting Japanese aggression as early as 1937 was publicly recognized in the statements of the majority of the delegates. However, the governments at war with Japan had not been able to agree among themselves as