

just begun, will affect both regular peace-keeping operations as well as rapid reaction capacity.

Despite gaps within the UN system, there are real grounds for optimism about parts of the organization. This is particularly true within DPKO and various components of the Secretariat that are working closely with DPKO. Despite, and perhaps because of the rapid growth of DPKO, there is a tangible atmosphere of self-motivation. Individuals appear to be readily identifying where they or the systems are not up to scratch and moving to address past gaps and failures. Just the very lack of denial that the problems exist is quite at a variance with many other parts of the UN, and in itself is refreshing. **Much of DPKO is perfectly justified in maintaining that they know what needs to be done, and can do it if only they were given sufficient resources.**

However, as with the larger issue of member states' political will, there remain some major impediments to rapid reaction that are internal to the UN. The abiding question will be whether they are endemic to the UN, and as such must be resolved in whole or part outside of the UN. Are there various functions such as rapid reaction that can be dealt with only partially by DPKO or other parts of the UN proper, and thus recommend themselves to being "contracted" out in one form or another?