

and subsystems, believed by participating states to have a destabilizing character or impact)

Examples include: no *replacement* of deployed military equipment of certain types (typically, tanks, heavily armoured combat vehicles (HACVs), self-propelled artillery, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters) with new, more advanced types; no *modernization* of deployed military equipment of certain types in certain key, well-defined respects; no *training* with new systems; no *field testing* of new designs; and no *production* of specified new systems or subsystems.

Confidence building agreements are constructed using these basic categories of CBMs in various combinations and to varying degrees of strictness. Measures can be assembled and designed in countless ways to address specific concerns. Agreements can include two or three very basic measures with modest limits or they can include a wide variety of diverse measures with very strict limits and thresholds. The Open Skies Treaty characterizes a very focused type of confidence building arrangement that concentrates on a hybrid task of inspection and observation. Its confidence building character flows from the willingness of participating states to permit neighbours access to troubling activities or facilities. The CSCE's Vienna Document, on the other hand, is a good example of a comprehensive agreement.

### **The Vienna Document 1992 — An Example of a Confidence Building Agreement**

The Vienna Document 1992 is the most recent of three comprehensive confidence building agreements developed in the CSCE context. Each has expanded on the content and scope of the preceding example, starting with the Stockholm Document of 1986. The Stockholm agreement, in turn, grew out of the much more modest Helsinki Final Act CBMs of 1975. The initial Helsinki CBMs were very modest and only one approached being obligatory. This principal CBM required the notification of manoeuvres by CSCE states in Europe exceeding 25,000 personnel 21 days in advance of their conduct unless they were arranged on short notice. The notification also was to include basic information about the manoeuvre. The Helsinki CBMs also included an observer invitation measure and a discretionary military movement notification measure.

An important lesson from the CSCE experience is the way in which the confidence building enterprise began with a modest package of measures and then expanded on it with each successive agreement to eventually produce a very comprehensive confidence building agreement. This is a pattern that we might expect to see repeated in other regions.