

face of this threat, East and West had common interests, and, with a third player in the game, one side's losses were no longer the other's gains. Both could gain or both could lose everything.

Just as it is now a commonplace in the West to speak of relations with the Soviet Union as combining elements of co-operation and conflict, so, too, did Soviet spokesmen argue as early as 1960 that class antagonism was not the sole component of East-West relations. Instead relations between capitalist and socialist countries were authoritatively defined as encompassing "both struggle and co-operation" ("*i bor'ba i sotrudnichestvo*").⁵³ This was a realistic formulation which recognized the inherent duality of East-West relations. It provided the Soviet leadership with a broad ideological umbrella enabling it to follow a mix of policies ranging from energetic efforts aimed at expanding Soviet world power to more benign policies directed toward a dramatic improvement of relations with the capitalist states.

Taken together, the various ideological innovations introduced by Khrushchev constitute a doctrinal revolution of totally unprecedented proportions. Neither before nor after Khrushchev has the Soviet Union experienced such sweeping ideological change. Yet, even though Khrushchev removed some of the ideological obstacles to detente and created some of the political pre-conditions for its realization, he was still unable to bring about a durable improvement in East-West relations. His accomplishments in the area of Marxist-Leninist theory were not matched by equal success in the realm of practical politics. He was able to achieve little more than several short-lived and unstable periods of thaw in the Cold War. Tensions diminished temporarily following the Geneva summit and the Soviet agreement to neutralize Austria in 1955, again in 1959 following Khrushchev's summit meeting with President Eisenhower at Camp David, and in 1963-1964, as a consequence of the Cuban missile crisis, which caused the United States and the Soviet Union to recoil from the brink of nuclear war and conclude the Limited Test Ban

⁵³ Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind*, pp. 205-209, 217-218.