

will be affected, whether or not we participate in SDI.

We would be foolish to expect stability to prevail in some areas of the Third World, in Eastern Europe and in parts of the West. Conflict and crisis are endemic in these areas. What we need are better methods to manage such crises, including a revival of the functions of the Security Council of the UN, the permanent members of which are the nuclear weapons states. Countries which can afford to provide military assistance to the UN Security Council must be ready to do so. Canada is one of these countries.

My own assumptions about Canada's strategic situation would be something of a mix of the two lists I have given.

While I have said that our traditional concept of "enemy" is out of date, it must be noted that Marxist/Leninist ideology describes a similar enemy – "imperialism." But there is evidence that in the Soviet Union today the principle purpose of policy is to reach some kind of *modus vivendi* with the West, based on arms control and exchange agreements. Public opinion in both East and West seems to be moving towards a common vision of the "enemy" as nuclear war itself.

How do we prevent that war? I doubt that the conventional view of deterrence is an adequate basis for long-term security, but for the time being there may be no practical alternative. We shall have to hope that measures to reduce troop levels and conventional weapons in Europe, to-

gether with agreements to scale down nuclear arsenals at all levels, will produce an international environment in which co-operation will eventually be substituted for deterrence. Conditions in the Third World, where Soviet planners assume there will be a continuing evolution of social forces in favour of "socialism," will make it difficult to put co-operation into practice. Perhaps there will be little choice. Global problems in the year 2000, with six billion people severely taxing the carrying capacity of the planet, may compel co-operation.

Canada is not in a position to defend itself alone; the defence of North America is indeed a single problem. The US will take account of our views in proportion to our willingness to contribute

to defence, but we should link our defence co-operation with the US to Canadian perspectives on strategic arms reductions.

To "refuse the cruise" contributes little to East/West relations. But we would not be testing the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) if such weapons systems had been banned. The cruise missile issue was formerly on the table at Geneva, and could be put there again.

The Atlantic Alliance offers, in addition to the means for defence co-operation, a vehicle for the expression of Canadian priorities, an insight that the Canadians who negotiated the North Atlantic Treaty had very much in mind. Let's make the best use of it. □



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