



outer space, and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In such areas, multilateral agreements will be necessary because existing and potential military capabilities in the respective areas go much beyond the East-West context and include states from all areas of the globe. Such negotiations will give enhanced salience to such multilateral negotiating forums as the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which in recent years seems to have suffered a weakening of its earlier sense of purposefulness. They will also bring about a different dynamic in international relations, one which will be much more complicated than that of the USA-USSR or East-West relationship.

Finally, I cannot conclude this brief evaluative survey without mentioning that favourite Canadian theme — verification. There now seem to be few who would contest the conclusion, based largely on our experience with arms control agreements concluded in the 1970s, that necessary political support for the arms control process is impossible to achieve in the absence of adequate verification provisions. Agreements which are not effectively verifiable by agreed methods can undermine reciprocal confidence more than they strengthen it. This is now widely accepted. It also seems to be increasingly accepted that effective verification provisions will in most instances require a degree of intrusiveness, involving a certain delegation of sovereignty of a type to which states are not yet well accustomed. In a complementary way, there seems also to be growing recognition that concrete verification measures need to be carefully tailored to the purposes, scope and nature of the specific agreement and that there should be safeguards against the potential abuse of such provisions for intelligence or other purposes not related to the agreement. What is perhaps not yet fully understood is that the effectiveness of verification, and the related enhanced confidence in compliance, will depend to a considerable extent on the parties adopting a cooperative, rather than a contestatory, approach to the implementation of agreed verification measures.

All of the main factors which I have mentioned in this hasty excursion through recent arms control history, I believe, have a direct relevance to the CW negotiations which are your primary focus of interest. Certainly, if what I discerned as a major adjustment in the broad political approach by the two leading military powers to arms control as a key element of their security relationship is correct, this has huge implications for the negotiations. The notable progress which has been made in the CW negotiations in the past two years has both reflected and contributed to this gradual improvement in the East-West atmosphere. In this connection, I am greatly encouraged that some of you are in this room fresh from having visited a major chemical weapons facility in the Soviet Union. The invitation for this visit was comparable to the 1983 USA invitation to CD members to visit a major chemical weapons facility in America. This is heartening.

As statements of several political leaders have already made clear, chemical weapons in the East-West setting are seen as acquiring increased significance in the context of moves towards reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, particularly within Europe. This makes your endeavours all the more relevant and is likely to result in increased political attention to your work. This may not at all moments seem a blessing to the negotiators but should nevertheless be welcomed as a sign of the growing seriousness with which prospective agreement is being addressed.

In a more broadly generic way, the successful negotiation of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons would be a pioneering achievement in the area of multilateral arms control. Unless I am mistaken, this would be the first time the international community would have negotiated a multilateral agreement, banning an entire class of weaponry, which incorporated detailed and elaborate verification provisions touching extensively on activities in civilian industry, and involving the establishment from scratch of a new treaty-administering authority to oversee its implementation in perpetuity. This, we all agree, poses

formidable challenges. It is a matter for encouragement that the negotiators are now giving increasing attention to issues relating to the structure, resources and decision-making procedures of the international authority. In the event of success, the results of the negotiation will without doubt in many respects serve as an important model for future multilateral agreements in other arms control areas. This, in addition to the inherent need for an effective ban on chemical weapons, makes it especially important that the negotiators address the thorny and intricate scientific, legal, institutional and financial issues with particular care and meticulousness. We must make haste, but with deliberation and without arbitrary deadlines.

Finally, while I have alluded to the significance of CW in the East-West context, it perhaps needs to be emphasized that the successful conclusion of a treaty is of importance not solely, perhaps not even mainly, in that limited context. Chemical weapons pose a global problem. CW capabilities and arsenals are not confined to the East-West context. In other areas of the world, CW capabilities exist and may have a proportionately greater military significance there. Currently, the repeated deplorable use of chemical weapons by Iraq, as officially confirmed by the UN Secretary-General, illustrates this disturbing reality. We must hope that countries from all regions recognize a common interest in the earliest possible conclusion and implementation of an effective ban, and will make their proportionate contribution to the final stages of the negotiation.

I began the substantive portion of my remarks by mentioning the corpus of existing international law. This includes, of course, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which outlaws the use of chemical weapons. The near-universal abhorrence of these weapons is reflected in the fact that the Protocol is now widely regarded as embodying customary international law. The conclusion of a comprehensive ban on such weapons would be rightly regarded as a long overdue completion and implementation of that law. Such an achievement could scarcely be overpraised."