supposed to learn new things, they gradually withdrew from a court which they were no longer qualified to adorn. Thus, as the lawyers had managed to exclude the clergy from the bar, they at last supplanted the barons on the bench; a result which the latter accepted only with feelings of deep jealousy and resentment, yielding reluctantly to an influence which they could not exactly understand.

After the Court of Parliament of Paris was made sedentary in that city by an edict of Philip the Fair, the bar began to take on more regular functions; and it rapidly developed into its modern form, and acquired its modern attributes. From that time the more able, learned and eloquent members of the bar, entering upon a more unimpeded career, rose fast to wealth, influence and distinction; but for a long time their personal safety was extremely precarious. One of the earliest lawyers of great note who perished by violence was Jean des Mares, a humane and upright man, an accomplished jurist, an eloquent advocate. During his long life he was devoted to the crown, and was of the greatest service in managing public affairs. When he was seventy-one years of age, a mob having broken out in the city, he addressed the infuriated populace in favor of moderation and peace. It is not known how, in doing this, he gave offence to the king, but Charles VI. commanded him to be seized and tried for treason. He was not permitted to speak in his own defence, and was hurried to the scaffold with a hundred other citizens of Paris, and there closed an honorable life with the calmness of a philosopher and the fortitude of a martyr. In other instances offended nobles made away with advocates whose tongues they could not otherwise silence, by assassination, sometimes private, sometimes judicial.

We have seen that in a very early period the bar had a jargon or dialect of its own; in losing this, other strange and formidable methods of speech came in vogue. Whether the example was at first set by the clergy who practiced in the courts, whether it was through their more general influence, or for whatever other reason it may have been, the oral pleadings of an advocate resembled a sermon more than anything else, and invariably began with some text of Scripture which he deemed suitable to his case, or pertinent to the remarks which he had to make. The formal partition of a discourse into regularly and extensively numerated divisions, which has been so often ridiculed, and which has become so odious to our modern ears, was regarded as an indispensable requisite of a forensic oration; and the greater the number of divisions, the greater apparently was deemed the discourse. One of the most urgent of the orders laid upon the bar was that they should make such divisions: "*Materiam causarum tuarum divide per membra, ut melius commendes memoriæ.*" Of all the recommendations to the bar, a satirical writer has said, this rule was only dominated by the first rule of all: "*Præferas solventes non solventibus;*" ("you shall prefer those who pay to those who pay not.") After citing and repeating his text of Scripture, so that the ruling idea of his discourse, the theme of all his variations, should not be lost sight of, the advocate proceeded to announce the divisions of his subject, and how these divisions were to be subdivided. What followed all this was a complete farrago of quotations from all authors, heathen and divine, thrown in apparently almost at random; the plaintiff was a Daniel, a Hyperion, or a Joseph, the defendant a Cleon, a satyr, or a son of Belial; artificial parallels between incidents in the trial and some fable of mythology were long drawn out; the text of Scripture was repeated at the beginning of every paragraph; half of the speech would be in Latin and Greek, and hardly any part of it to the purpose.

Such was the taste of the age. Looking over these dreary intellectual secretions, which seem to us to be only persuasives to suicide, we may wonder how the judges could endure to listen to such impertinent medleys; and yet in only one recorded instance did a judge manifest any impatience at the received style, and we cannot be quite certain that he was impatient then. There was a case before the court arising out of a contract to manufacture or sell a certain number of jugs. The advocate began by citing a text of Scripture to the effect that the potter has power over the clay, and may make one vessel to honor and another to dishonor. Then after stating the divisions of his subject, he began with the manufacture of earthenware vessels among the Utruscans, and dwelt at great length upon the caramic art among the