

refused to make liaison officers available without entry permits issued by the South to the demilitarized zone these the South was not repeat not prepared to give.)

7. We realize that operations aimed at a cordon sanitaire under Commission auspices might prove expensive, both in personnel and equipment. The past history of the Commission in South Vietnam also suggests that there might be resistance on the part of the GRVN. Nevertheless the increasing gravity of the internal position in South Vietnam might have effected a change in their outlook. Also it seems to us that at a time when the provisions of the Cease-Fire Agreement prohibiting the introduction of men and material may be on the point of losing their significance, the scope for Commission action will increasingly centre on reducing to the maximum extent possible the sources of friction between the North and South. Furthermore, in the light of charges and counter-charges between the North and South about their aggressive intentions, it would seem very difficult for either the North or South seriously to question the reasonableness of increased patrolling under Commission auspices aimed ostensibly at preventing traffic over borders in either direction.

*Reporting etc.*

8. In addition to reviewing the Vietnam Cease-Fire Agreement with the objective of setting forth the parts of the Agreement on which the Commission can carry out its essential remaining tasks in the period ahead, some attention should be paid in any general review to the adequacy of the Commissions past and current procedures for reporting to the Co-Chairmen, and for publicizing its activities.

9. In connection with the preparation of such interim reports, while certain matters may lend themselves to treatment by the Commission on the basis of unanimity, matters of principle have arisen and will continue to arise on which majority reports on a Canadian-Indian basis, or if necessary a minority report on a Canadian basis, must be seriously considered.

10. Our impression is that the preparation of interim reports to the Co-Chairmen have covered unduly long periods in the past. In the future, efforts should be made both to encourage more [frequent] reports to the Co-Chairmen and at the same time to expedite the public release of Commission reports.

11. Such efforts might be supplemented by arranging for more extensive publicity to be given to such reports when the Co-Chairmen have approved their release. This might be done, for example, by additional statements or press releases in Ottawa, and by supplementary efforts in Washington and other capitals involved. From a publicity point of view, the Commission's activities have been wrapped in "cotton wool" for too long a period.

12. It would also be of interest, in consultation with our delegation in Saigon, to obtain the delegation's comments on the local arrangements for contacts between the Commission and the press in the course of the Commission's work. Our recollection is that such contacts were primarily, if not repeat not exclusively, in the hands of the Indian Chairman, and that very frequently there was little or no repeat no opportunity to provide Canadian perspectives on matters before the Commission. In the period we are now entering, a greater effort might be made on Canadian behalf to ensure that our views on contentious matters are given hearing. Even if this should prove to be difficult on the spot (and we recognize the problems), official statements or replies to questions in the House provide an alternative method for focussing public attention on the larger matters before the Commission and the Canadian position.

*North-South Conciliation*

13. One further suggestion which might be considered in any general examination of the Commission's role is the need for creating a better balance between the Commission's presence in South Vietnam and in the North. Now that the pressures on the Commission to transfer its activities to Hanoi have been reduced in intensity, this question should be looked at