

ments to get .303 ammunition from Australia, and would be glad to learn whether any .30 calibre ammunition was available from Canada.

3. Mr. Van Kleffens said that the Government and people of the Dutch East Indies were determined to defend themselves if attacked. They had shown in the recent trade negotiations that they were ready to make reasonable concessions to reasonable Japanese demands, but he wished to assure the Prime Minister that the Netherlands Government would not yield further to pressure.

4. Mr. Van Kleffens emphasized the importance of holding resolutely to the strategic line running from Singapore through the Netherlands Indies and Australia. There had been, he thought, some tendency in British official circles to feel that, if war came in the South Pacific, nothing could be held east of Singapore. He felt this opinion was erroneous and had now been abandoned. It would be a disastrous mistake to allow the Japanese, even temporarily, to get control of the oil, rubber and tin resources of the Netherlands Indies or of Australian lead, zinc and iron. It would be easier to keep them out than dislodge them and defence policy should be based on this premise.

5. Japanese commercial airlines had been anxious to establish a base in the Netherlands Indies but had been refused facilities. They had, however, succeeded in securing a base in Portuguese Timor, which is in the centre of the East Indian Archipelago and half-way between Java and Port Darwin. From Timor the Japanese had a regular service to their mandated island of Palau. Mr. Van Kleffens said that Dutch commercial planes called at Timor every week and kept an eye on Japanese activities there, about which they had protested unavailingly to Premier Salazar of Portugal. The Dutch were not very much impressed with Japanese prowess or efficiency in the air. As an illustration of the rigid and unadaptable methods of the Japanese, he cited an incident in which Japanese pilots had wrecked, one after another, 18 of a fleet of 30 Lockheed planes because they refused to recognize that the Lockheed's design required a different technique in taking off from the ground than that employed in other airplanes.

6. Mr. Van Kleffens had met the New Zealand Prime Minister in Surabaya on the latter's way to London and had himself visited New Zealand on his way to this continent. He thought the New Zealand defence position was weak and exposed, but that their geographical remoteness and lack of strategic mineral resources made them a very unlikely object of attack.

7. In Manila Mr. Van Kleffens had found Mr. F. B. Sayre, the United States High Commissioner, extremely friendly and helpful. The American attitude could be illustrated by a story from his own experience. He wished while in Manila to have a confidential talk with Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, G.O.C. Malaya, who had flown to the Philippines for the purpose of seeing him. The Netherlands Consulate seemed an inappropriate meeting place and there were obvious objections to a meeting in the hotel. The United States