

ther place in the United States, which the policy of their government may judge proper to encourage.

If the settlement of Louisiana is not advantageous to France in a commercial view, because it diverts capital from a much more important channel, it is still more contrary to her interests, in a political point of view: America is of the utmost importance to France, whether considered as a commercial or maritime power. I have explained my opinion fully in this first relation on another occasion; as to the other, there is no question that an agricultural nation, which, by her industry and her raw materials, is able to procure all the superfluous luxuries of Europe, and whose habits and occupations prevent them from manufacturing for themselves, there can be no question that such a nation must afford a very important market to the inhabitants of the old world.

In this view the commerce of the United States is considered as very profitable to England, but when French manufactures shall have obtained all the improvement of which they are capable; when commerce shall be established upon a suitable basis, it will present a much greater variety of articles upon which to support itself than the commerce of England. Woollen articles and hardware are the only articles which America receives from England; but France shall furnish not only all these, but her agriculture will gain by the sale of her wines, her brandies and her oils. These advantages, added to the relative situation of France and the United States, which removes every suspicion of rivalry between them, both by sea and land, have exhibited France as the natural ally of the United States, to the eye of those who have considered, in the extent of her power, a new pledge of the security of their

commerce and their future tranquillity. They have done homage to the wisdom of those statesmen who at the conclusion of an advantageous war, have thought that France would gain more by securing the solid friendship of the United States, than by acquiring a territory which would be for them an object of jealousy, and might again force them under the domination of a people whose yoke they had just assisted them to shake off.

I am not ignorant how delicate it is to foretell political misfortunes which might result to France and the United States from the possession of Louisiana and the Floridas by the former. I must either conceal that which truth would have me say, or on the other hand, frighten certain querulous minds, who may fancy they see a threat in my frankness. Nevertheless, a citizen of one of the two nations, and strongly attached to the other, I hope that those to whom this memorial may be delivered, will be able to set a just value on the motives of my conduct, and will see in it nothing but my exertions to remove every subject of dispute between two people formed to assist one another; and although I am too well acquainted with the resources of my own country to dread the power of any of the European nations, it will easily be seen, that I am incapable of conceiving the ridiculous idea of threatening a government which has seen all Europe bend the knee before its power.

I have observed, that France and the United States are, in a relative situation, so fortunate as to have no point of collision. They may assist without being tempted to hurt one another in any manner. This commerce is useful to both nations; this union of sentiments and interests rests upon principles which ought to form the