Government Orders

Those provisions are at the centre of the proposals now being discussed. What is missing now, indeed what has always been missing, is the trigger that could set all this in motion: an Iraqi commitment to and total withdrawal from Kuwait. The question that has to be asked is: Where is Iraq's response? What is Iraq's attitude?

We are told there are other ways to get Saddam Hussein out. This government and the world, for 167 days, have been trying to find a way to get him out without conflict. I say absolutely seriously if anyone in this House, anyone in this country, has a plausible plan—I am not talking here about a dream; I am talking about a plan—then this government and Canadians need to hear it immediately.

I want to conclude by returning to the fundamental principle at issue here: the defence and construction of a durable structure of international order. That is not a foreign cause to Canadians and it is certainly not a faked cause. That is a Canadian cause. That is a cause worth defending. We are not a great power. We cannot impose order just as we cannot ignore order. We have no choice but to build order with others and to do that co-operatively.

We need that order. We need a co-operative order in trade for our prosperity. We need a co-operative order in security since we cannot provide it ourselves on this huge territory in an age of nuclear weapons. Canadians need co-operative order because its absence would mean the power of the strongest always wins; the law of the jungle as the Prime Minister said this morning.

To build that order, we must work with others. It is not an accident that Lester Pearson and others were so active in drafting the charter of the United Nations and helping to make it work. It is not an accident that Canada has been such a strong proponent of a reformed NATO, a new GATT, a strengthened CSCE, an active Commonwealth, a more effective OAS, a vital *la francophonie*, and an expanded structure of security dialogue with the Asia–Pacific region.

No other country in the world has been a more active and generous and persistent contributor and supporter of the development of a United Nations system which works.

If the Persian Gulf situation is not resolved in the way the United Nations has demanded, if Saddam Hussein is allowed to keep the spoils of his conquest, then Canadians must accept a United Nations which will fail in the future, a United Nations which will be unable to deter or turn back further aggression, an organization seriously weakened in its ability to help develop countries or to help feed children or to help clean up the environment. The world has just begun to treat the United Nations seriously. Surely, Sir, this is not the time to stop.

In the Persian Gulf, the world has returned to the United Nations. It is not departing from the charter; it is returning to the charter. This is not contrary to peace-keeping. Peacekeeping was invented because the UN did not work, because the great powers did not want it to make peace, but only to supervise truces. Those who invented peacekeeping, Mr. Pearson included, lamented the inability of the world community to make peace. The gulf is about returning to the principle that the best guarantee of peace is the guarantee that aggression will not be accepted.

Some hon. members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Clark (Yellowhead): Other events fill in this picture. The United States, as I mentioned earlier, has returned to the United Nations. So have others, including the Soviet Union. In so doing, as they came back, national purposes have been modified, compromises have been made, and consensus has been built.

What possible incentive would any great power have in returning to that organization in the future, in making compromises, in seeking consensus, if now, after all of this, after one of the most naked acts of aggression in 50 years is allowed to succeed? What possible Canadian interests does it serve to have unilateral action rewarded whether by Saddam Hussein or other aggressors or by others who would respond to aggression?

I do not want to overstate the case. If there is war in the gulf, it will not be the war to end all wars. But neither do I want to understate the case. There will be no hope to deter aggression, no hope to reverse aggression, no hope to keep peace or to make it co-operatively, if the world fails the United Nations here.