

*NORAD—Canada-U.S. Agreement*

bilateral arrangement. Instead of moving forward to the ultimate United Nations conception of an international police force, in this arrangement, from the point of view of this group, we are moving backwards to a bilateral arrangement; and in addition to that, another danger is that the strategic air force of the United States is completely under the command of the President of the United States.

You will recall, Mr. Speaker, as will hon. members, that at the time of the attack on the Suez canal Mr. Dulles was most insistent then and later that before any action was taken in Europe there must be consultation within NATO, and correctly so; but at the same time or very shortly afterwards he expressed the opinion that the United States would not submit to similar consultation before it took action in the Pacific region. That situation causes this group very considerable concern.

There is another very important implication underlying the diplomatic notes exchanged between Canada and the United States. These notes provide for the placement of Canadian service units under United States General Partridge and thus Canada has already taken a major step leading to the surrender of her sovereignty to a single power. It is one thing to surrender sovereign rights under a multilateral organization such as NATO or to such a body as the United Nations, but in our opinion it is an entirely different matter to surrender sovereign rights to a single country under a bilateral agreement which is what will be accomplished, in our view, in the case of Canada's position under the NORAD arrangement. Because a Canadian will act as deputy commander to the chief of NORAD does not in any way alter this fact.

Canadian air units will be submerged in the over-all offensive and defensive North American organization which is to be directly controlled by United States commanders. Furthermore, the growing integration of Canadian and United States air defence has an important economic implication in addition to the more obvious political implication of the loss by Canada of sovereign rights and control over certain of its service units. Defence integration is forcing Canada to become more and more dependent upon the technological skills and economic abilities of the United States in connection with the design and production of military equipment. The effect of this is to accentuate the general economic dependence of Canada upon the United States. This is one thing in connection with the NORAD agreement which gives this group, and I think a great many of the people of Canada, cause for very serious concern. For

[Mr. Herridge.]

example, two days following the tabling of the notes on NORAD the Secretary of State for External Affairs made another important announcement relating to the defence of North America as recorded at page 309 of *Hansard* of May 21, 1958. He said:

—the Canadian government has granted permission to the United States government to conduct surveys in Canada to determine to what extent, if any, the ever-increasing speed of air weapons has created special communications requirements, including the improvement of existing facilities which may be needed to perfect the flow of detection and warning information for radar warning of ballistic missiles.

Reports indicate that the result of this survey will be the introduction of United States semi-automatic ground environment, known as SAGE, for the making automatic of ground control operations in Canadian air defence. The same system is being installed in the United States and it has for some time been suggested in United States quarters that the same would have to be done in Canada if successful air defence integration of the two countries is to be achieved. An integral part of the SAGE system is a ground-to-air guided missile known as Bomarc, which is capable of being fitted with an atomic warhead. While the SAGE Bomarc system may well provide the means of intercepting the latest manned jet bombers, it is a well known fact that it would be entirely impotent against the intercontinental ballistic missile. We are already hearing, therefore, of the additional need for some yet undeveloped anti-ballistic missile system.

In our opinion it is a certainty that our technical and industrial abilities are not nearly sufficient to meet the present requirements of the design and manufacture of highly complex electronic equipment and intricate missile systems. Furthermore, the rapid rate of obsolescence of such equipment and the consequent need to replace it at frequent intervals creates an impossible situation for a country of our small capacities.

The implications for the Canadian economy are becoming increasingly apparent. As defence requirements become more and more complex it would seem that our economy will become more and more interdependent with that of the United States. Already one hears suggestions of the need to integrate our defence production with the United States economy, with Canadian industry manufacturing component parts for United States assemblies. The future pattern may be that Canadian industry, if it is to get any share at all in the production of new and complex equipment needed in the air defence of Canada, may have to be satisfied with participating as subcontractors in large United States