

A greater sharing in the military direction and a greater share in the common burden are two sides of the same coin. Both would be designed to give a greater number of member states a more responsible stake in the alliance.

The other fundamental change of attitude which we believe is necessary is in the relation between the civilian and military arms of the alliance. Within our own countries, we have all found in recent years that there must be a close interrelation between our foreign and defence policies. In the complex world of 1960 it is simply not feasible to try to compartmentalize the diverse ways in which threats to our security can and do materialize, and at this point is prominently made in our White Paper on Defence, which I referred a moment ago. That is why civilian and military policy-makers must each know what the other is doing at all times. Yet in NATO we are still very short of this kind of co-ordination between the two arms of the alliance. The military planners put forward requirements without due regard to the political and economic factors that are bound to weigh heavily with governments. The civilian side of governments, as a result, are inclined to pay less attention to their military advisers and this in turn tends to generate frustration on the military side. I am sure we must somehow break out of this vicious circle.

East-West Relations

May I now turn to some of the major political problems that we must face in the coming years? Relations between the Soviet world and the West are at one of those stages where prediction is a particularly precarious exercise. While there are no immediate crises with the Soviet Union, there is also no apparent movement toward settlement of any of our major differences. I do not believe that we need be discouraged by this state of affairs, particularly when we reflect on the factors that have brought it about. Among these I include our firmness in meeting the Soviet threat wherever it has been directed and, of course, in particular over Berlin; the realization by the Soviet Union of the appalling risks of a thermonuclear war; the internal changes and problems within the Soviet world; and the increasingly centrifugal forces within the Communist camp which are being given impetus by the growing split between the Soviet Union and China. If we maintain our military strength and political cohesion and do not lose our nerve, there is a good chance that, in the long run, events on the other side may create the necessary conditions to permit the start of serious negotiations on the central problems dividing us, including, not least, those of Germany and Berlin.

Meanwhile, we cannot afford to remain inactive. First, we should make it clear at all times to the other side that we are willing to negotiate seriously, with the aim of achieving solutions that do not give undue advantage to one side or the other. Secondly, we should continue, within the alliance, to try to define the nature of the solutions to be sought in negotiations with the Soviet world when the time comes. In this connection I am, of course, thinking