

On the other hand, it might be desirable to incorporate in the preambular part of a future CW convention a reference to the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Bacteriological (Biological) Convention and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, as well as a reaffirmation of adherence to their principles and objectives and an appeal for their universalization.

Verification

Adequate verification of compliance with the obligations assumed under a CW convention can effectively be assured through appropriate combination of national verification measures and specific international mechanisms and procedures.

The framework of national verification measures would be provided by specific legislation enacted by each State Party to the convention whereas international mechanisms would be developed around an international consultative committee (body) and a complaint procedure involving the UN Security Council.

In case of suspected violation of the provisions of the convention any party to the convention would have the right, bilaterally or through the consultative committee (body), to approach the suspected party asking for clarification, investigation of facts on site or off site. It is to be understood that responding to such a well founded request, the party thus approached would offer appropriate clarification of fact, issue an invitation for on site investigation or take other substantiated decision.

It is generally recognized that verification problem in a CW convention is at least as important as it is complex. Precisely in order to facilitate such verification, the USSR and the United States in their Joint Report (CD/112) have suggested the use, in addition to the general purpose criterion, of supplementary toxicity criteria.

In the context of the recent consideration of the question of the ban of chemical weapons, both in the Committee on Disarmament and in its ad hoc working group, a view was expressed that while desirable, an absolutely effective verification system may be impossible to elaborate. For one thing, the verification of a ban on precursors of identified single purpose CW agents is quite difficult in view of their wide application in a variety of peaceful industrial processes. Indeed, to tell which one of such precursors could be used for CW purposes, in violation of the CW convention, might well border on