

in Central Europe. In economic and cultural matters Soviet diplomats would be likely to accept limited exchanges of persons and ideas, broader cultural contacts, cooperation in the preservation of the environment, and joint East-West projects in the development of mineral resources, hydro-electric power, transportation networks, computer technology, peaceful uses of atomic energy, and so on. The negotiation of these varied measures would be approached in a business-like manner, and preferably with a minimum of recrimination and propaganda. Obvious attempts to play Western powers against one another would be avoided, as would any attempt to give clearly favourable treatment to West Germany, France, or the EEC. Moscow would continue to refrain from singling the European neutrals out for special cultivation. Nor would it appeal directly to the United States, given the American reluctance to appear to be bargaining over the head of its allies. Throughout, the Soviets could be expected to behave in an evenhanded and unexpectedly conciliatory fashion, making reasonable compromises in order to reach a series of limited agreements that would further the evolution of an East-West setting more conducive to rapid Soviet internal development.

It should be emphasized that we have been outlining a tendency in Soviet behaviour on the matter of East-West relations in Europe. We have not been attempting to describe