

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

initiative if, in carrying out its verification activities of a systematic nature, the need arises to clarify any ambiguous situations. Last year, ideas to this effect were advanced by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom and before that by Australia. We hope that the authors of the idea of ad hoc inspections will make their proposals more specific.

National trial inspections can play a significant role in the elaboration of the verification system as a whole. We concluded such an experiment last December at the chemical plant in Dzerzhinsk, at the facility producing N,N-dialkylaminoethanols, i.e., a key precursor considered in the context of schedule [2]. Both an initial visit involving the preparation of a facility attachment, and a routine inspection, were carried out. In preparing for and conducting the experiment considerable use was made of the recommendations drawn up in September 1988 at the multilateral consultations under the guidance of the Swedish delegation. In our opinion, as early as this spring session it is necessary to analyse thoroughly the results of national experiments and map out the programme for future work in this field. It is also evident that the problem of verification of non-production of chemical weapons cannot be adequately solved without parallel progress on other aspects of article VI. Therefore, we deem it important to continue efforts to secure agreement on the provisions relating to the schedules of chemicals and a procedure for including in the schedules, when necessary, new chemicals posing a risk for the convention.

In this context, it is very important to block off all possible avenues for developing new types of chemical weapons. In this connection, I think we should give more substantive consideration to the proposal to set up a scientific council within the framework of the organs of the convention. We are looking forward to receiving the document on that subject which Minister R. Dumas of France promised to submit to the Conference in the near future. Other aspects of the machinery of the future convention also remain to be finalized, including the issue of the composition of the Executive Council.

Finally, efforts should be continued to draft the final clauses of the convention and to resolve other legal issues. The new stage the negotiations have entered requires a new approach to the organizational aspect as well. It is clear that we currently face a situation in which many outstanding issues run through all our work, and that their solution requires an integrated approach to various articles of the convention, annexes and other parts of the "rolling text". We therefore lend our support to the efforts of the representative of France, Ambassador P. Morel, to change the structure of work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in order to create additional "administrative opportunities" for redoubling our efforts at the negotiations. Naturally, in so doing our main attention should continue to be directed towards reaching agreement on the text of the convention. The results of the Paris Conference impose a great responsibility on the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the first response should be the adoption of an improved mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons taking those results into account and guiding the participants in the negotiations towards their early successful conclusion.