

nuclear weapons were currently based, or on the territory of members of either of the two major military alliances;

- Existing NWFZs remain controversial, both within the regions of their application, and as regards outside powers whose support is sought by virtue of their having possessions within the zone and/or nuclear-weapon status. In no case have NWFZs managed to gain the support of all the states of a region or all of the eligible external powers;
- In terms of the functional scope of their coverage, existing NWFZs do not go beyond prohibitions on nuclear explosive devices (and in the Latin American case, not even this far). Most notably, they do not restrict either nuclear weapon-capable delivery systems or a range of installations and activities having to do with command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) — all essential elements of the nuclear weapons infrastructure whose inclusion is demanded by many proponents of NWFZs in other parts of the world;
- Existing NWFZs have lent themselves to differing interpretations, which have the effect of undermining their effectiveness. Of these, perhaps the most serious have to do with the provision of negative security assurances by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the continuing disagreement between East and West over whether transits and port calls by nuclear-armed vessels and aircraft in the territories of zonal members should be permitted. Neither of the two existing treaties prohibits the latter; on the contrary, one — the South Pacific NWFZ — explicitly leaves it up to the host nation to decide, while it is clear from the negotiating record of the other — Tlatelolco — that the same principle applies in its case as well; and
- None of the major maritime powers accepts the notion of a NWFZ extending beyond the national territories of its members to encompass portions of the high seas and international airspace, or interfering with traditional rights of passage through international straits, etc..