Committee, Marshal Akhromeyov stated that the Soviets produce 1,700 tanks each year, but that production would be reduced by forty percent by the end of 1990.

NATO's Future Force Structure

In an October interview at the Pentagon, General John R. Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, defined NATO defence priorities in the event that deep cuts in conventional forces are negotiated at Vienna.

Galvin reaffirmed the NATO doctrine of flexible response, and indicated that force modernization would be required to maintain flexible response if there are major reductions in conventional forces. His top priority is a shortrange nuclear missile to succeed the Lance, and an air-to-surface missile which would be nuclear capable. (The Lance has a range of only 130 kilometres, whereas the INF Treaty leaves it open to both sides to deploy short-range missiles with ranges up to five hundred kilometres.)

Galvin also suggested that future NATO forces would emphasize flexibility and mobility in

order to compensate for reduced numbers. This would include long-range air forces and mobile ground forces capable of disrupting enemy attempts to concentrate and move forces quickly. It would also require greater ability to mobilize reserves promptly, and, therefore, a willingness on the part of NATO governments to make early decisions about mobilization. For this reason, Galvin suggested that high priority should go to improved reconnaissance capabilities able to give early and unambiguous warning of troop build-ups.

While all of these developments would be expensive, aircraft reductions now under discussion in Vienna will provide NATO with an opportunity to modernize its forces by transferring late-model aircraft. Since all member countries would be required to reduce their European-based aircraft, there will be opportunities to phase out older aircraft such as the Alpha jet and the F-4 Phantom, and replace them with more capable F-15s and F-16s. Discussions are underway to ensure that, within NATO as a whole,

is estimated to have a range of up to 1,000 km and will be deployed in the mid-1990s. Missiles with shorter ranges have been supplied to a number of Middle East countries by the Soviet Union, China, and (in the case of the Lance missile to Israel) the United States.

In South America the Argentinean development of the Condor has been matched by Brazil, which, in April 1989, successfully tested the Sonda IV with an estimated range of 1,000 kilometres. In South Asia, India successfully tested the Agni medium-range missile (potential range of 2,500 km) in the Bay of Bengal, in May 1989. Pakistan announced earlier in the year that it had developed a rocket booster with a range of 600 kilometres.

The apparently inexorable spread of ballistic missile technology and production has taken place despite an agreement among seven leading Western countries (including Canada) to limit exports and prevent the transfer of technology. The Missile Technology Control Regime established in April 1987 was applicable to missiles able to carry a payload in excess of 500 kg (the smallest payload for a nuclear weapon) over 500 kilometres. All of the missiles described above are in this category. Over the past two years the United States and the Soviet Union have held discussions on further steps that might be taken to curb the spread of ballistic missiles, including the possible participation of the Soviet Union in the Control Regime. The United States began a strategic review of missile proliferation in mid-1989, the results of which have not yet been disclosed.

the least capable aircraft are eliminated first.

The prospect of significant reductions in numbers of aircraft and tanks is also reviving discussions about specialized roles and missions within NATO. In Washington, influential commentators have suggested, for example, that at some future point the US might specialize in the air defence of Europe, implying that most if not all ground forces would be provided by the Europeans.

The Senate Special Committee Report

Such discussions, although tentative, could have a strong influence on the future structure of Canadian defence forces. In October, the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence released its report on Canada's Land Forces.

The Report recognizes that, in reality, the commitments made in the 1987 White Paper have been dropped. The White Paper determined that Canada would abandon its commitment to send a brigade to Northern Norway, and consolidate its ground forces in southern Germany at the existing Canadian base at Lahr. The new Canadian commitment was to be an armoured division, of which one brigade and division-strength equipment would be based in Germany, with one brigade in Canada prepared for rapid deployment to Germany. This commitment would have involved an increase of about 2,000 personnel in Germany, and, among other equipment requirements, the purchase of some two hundred and fifty main battle tanks.

Recognizing that these changes will not take place, the Senate Report investigates alternative force commitments for Canada. It begins by emphasizing the importance of the current conventional force negotiations, and the need, therefore, not to create difficulties through unilateral withdrawal from Europe. At the same time, the conjunction of Canada's search for a credible defence policy and the changes imminent in Europe offer an opportunity to re-

duce "the disparity between stated land force commitments in Europe and actual capabilities."

The Report explores two possibilities. The first is to restructure for "defensive defence." In this approach Canada would provide a front-line, light-armoured division based on six flexible "manoeuvre elements." Only two of these elements would have tanks in Europe. The other elements would emphasize battlefield mobility and anti-tank defensive operations. The Report suggests that such a force would require only about 3,500 troops permanently deployed in Europe, with the other elements air transportable from Canada.

The second force commitment considered is an air-mobile reserve force which might continue to be based at Lahr. Although such a force would be compatible with current NATO thinking, the Report recognizes that the helicopters and other equipment required would involve an awkward transition from the present structure and require initially large commitments to purchase new equipment. By contrast, the light division concept would require relatively few new weapon systems.

The mandate of the Senate Committee did not lead it to review the broader question of specialization which might, for example, suggest that either the land commitment or the air commitment to Europe be abandoned. The Report is nevertheless timely in contributing to the review of Canadian defence policy. It seems evident that major decisions about the future of Canadian defence forces will depend in part on the broader debate within NATO. On the other hand, changing force commitments within the alliance may soon offer the Canadian government a second opportunity to define a credible defence policy.

- DAVID COX