

reasons like those above given, the question itself is illegitimately asked. This, however, does not obviate the fact that men do continually ask these illegitimate questions; and the practice can never be put a stop to by wholesale condemnation of questions which we *suppose* to be of this sort as "metaphysical." They can only be proved to be of this sort, by exhibiting the various categories in a true light. Some metaphysic of experience is the only possible corrective to the metaphysics of speculative ontology and transcendentalism. But, when all that man can say and do is said and done, it can still be asked, though never known, whether there is anything objectively, and in its own nature, closed to all possible human perception and inference. Thus, there are certain futilities of speculation which must always come under the head of the unanswerable.

Admitting this, we should learn to ask only questions which can be answered; not hanging doubtful mysteries on the outskirts of the universe, but progressively unveiling the mysterious universe itself. Mysterious—yet knowable; for knowledge and mystery never part company, except in the heads of pedants and parrot-taught schoolboys! Mystery is good; it is the very incitement to further knowledge. Only mystification and mysticism are to be avoided, since they make mysteries where there are none, and hug others which might be solved.

The view that "unanswerable" is a legitimate sense of "unknowable" thus leads round to my other point, that an objective Unknowable cannot be substantiated, being simply the purport of one of those futile questions which an efficient philosophy would shelve as unanswerable. Those realities of the cosmos comprehending humanity, which are either directly experienced or inferred to exist in a manner to be experienced, constitute the whole object-matter of knowledge. The ultimate categories of consciousness are the fundamental modes or aspects of existence, as we know it. We have, however, to distinguish between categories of consciousness, as universal signification and categories of consciousness, as a specific functioning of the individual human being. It is the former which are philosophical ultimates; one such being existence in the historical mode, already dwelt upon. This category comprehends equally the object-matter of physical science and that of psychology: all facts and all feelings alike exemplify it. The psychological ultimates, such as sensation and thought (in its ordinary subjective sense), obviously do not comprehend the object-matter of physical science, though they are the necessary means of representing it to ourselves.

