

clearly that U.S. atomic energy legislation, taken in conjunction with the U.S. draft treaty, ensured that non-nuclear countries within NATO could not obtain "access to" — the general and rather vague phrase used by the Soviet representative — or, more precisely and more importantly, control over and the power to use nuclear weapons so far as his Government was concerned through nuclear sharing arrangements under discussion within the Alliance. The British representative, having noted that a new international entity with the power to use nuclear weapons could not, under the U.S. draft treaty, come into being unless one of the existing nuclear powers had simultaneously or previously abandoned its independent nuclear capability, went on to record the "irrevocable opposition of my Government to any arrangement which would have the effect of making the use of nuclear weapons subject to a majority vote, as distinct from a unanimous vote or at least a vote in which existing nuclear countries have the power of veto".

Western spokesmen also pointed out that NATO was an evolving alliance, which could not accept any Soviet condition that it should maintain the *status quo* forever — a condition implicit in Soviet demands that arrangements enabling members to share in collective defence arrangements involving nuclear weapons should be abandoned as a pre-condition to Soviet participation in a non-proliferation agreement. NATO was based on the conception of shared responsibilities — there were no inferior partners; these principles applied to all its members.

On August 31, the Soviet representative noted that: "The discussion which has taken place so far, both in the ENDC and outside it, on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons points to the fact that, as yet, we have no common basis for agreement on this matter". On September 7, the Soviet representative agreed that the United States draft would ban the dissemination of nuclear weapons by "the direct transfer by nuclear powers of such weapons to non-nuclear states, the transfer of such weapons through military alliances to the national control of non-nuclear states, and the creation by non-nuclear states of their own nuclear weapons". But, he maintained, this draft would legalize the establishment of multilateral nuclear forces, which, in the Soviet view, would allow the Federal Republic of Germany and other non-nuclear member states of NATO access to nuclear weapons. The final word from the Soviet representative in ENDC was to reject the U.S. draft as a basis for serious negotiation.

On a subject as important as that of non-dissemination, of course, the views of the U.S.S.R. and its allies are not the only ones that must be considered, and provisions to meet the concerns of the non-aligned countries were, therefore, incorporated.

At the end of the session, the non-aligned countries summed up their views on non-dissemination in a memorandum that described the basic approach of the eight to this question as follows:

A treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but only a means to an end. That end is the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. The eight delegations are convinced that measures to pro-