

neither of us knew that the Secretary-General's telegrams of yesterday had already been despatched, but Hickerson was aware that some such action was impending.

4. Our conversation covered a wide field and I am reporting in other messages on other questions which arose. The points touched on in this message are matters dealt with in your personal telegram and in our conversations. Ends.

44.

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*Le délégué permanent par intérim auprès des Nations Unies
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting Permanent Delegate to United Nations
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 474

New York, July 15, 1950

TOP SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Repeat Washington No. 61.

KOREA

1. I have had a word with Cordier concerning the Secretary-General's message yesterday. I told him that you had been upset by this message, and that you considered that it was inappropriate to hear a message of this kind for the first time from press reports of the Secretary-General's press conference, and secondly that a step like this ought not to have been taken without consultation at least with the countries which might be expected to contribute and would therefore be most embarrassed by the message. I referred to the fact that he had mentioned this possibility to me the afternoon before, but said that I had no idea that this proposal was under urgent consideration at the time. I explained to him the very difficult position in which it put the Canadian Government and said that it did not help in securing the best response from Canadians. Cordier accepted this criticism and recognized that things had not been done in the best possible way. He said that he was afraid that things in Korea might have forced their hands into acting precipitately. (In this connection I might say that the New York Press throughout yesterday was filled with panicky headlines about the breaching of the Kum river, and at both New York and Lake Success there was a feeling that unless some drastic steps were taken there might be an immediate disaster). Cordier went on to say tactfully that the Secretariat were getting into a very serious problem. He first implied that heavy pressure was being put upon the Secretary-General to secure more help. Then he added: "Well, perhaps I shouldn't say pressure." He said that they had stayed up most of Thursday night into Friday morning working on particulars about the proper machinery. They thought that they had reached the desired formula and intended sending out the messages first thing Friday morning. In the morning, however, they encountered new problems and the message was delayed. Their intention had been that the message would reach Governments before the Secretary-General mentioned it. I gathered that in the excitement they did not take care to see that the messages had been sent out before the Secretary-General spoke.