The socialists and Communists, who should logically have led the struggle against British imperialism, were divided into many groups, whose activities were limited almost entirely to intellectual and trade union circles in the big cities. The Communists, with the exception of one group, the HADETO, looked with suspicion upon a revolution carried out by a handful of men who had no ideology and little or no political experience, and had to rely upon professional politicians of the bad old days.

The Free Officers and the bulk of the people had, however, lost faith in the effectiveness of political parties that, whether of the right or left, had little to show for all their theorizing.

"We must decide at once what philosophy of government we are going to follow," Nasser announced at the first meeting of the Free Officers' executive committee immediately after Farouk's departure on July 26, 1952. He insisted that the decision must be reached that very night whether Egypt was to be ruled by democracy or dictatorship. All but one of the eight members of the nine-man committee present at the meeting voted for dictatorship. The exception was Nasser himself.

Whether Nasser's call for democracy reflected his inner convictions is open to debate. His detractors saw it as a gimmick to enlist popularity. His defenders believed in his sincerity and held that the subsequent drift into dictatorship was the inevitable result of the political confusion in the country and the struggle for power, which posed a threat to the revolution from the outset.

The sincere or proclaimed desire to establish democracy faced the many pitfalls of a multitude of parties, each with its own vision of how to rule the country. This was Nasser's dilemma. To have handed over to these competing factions would have led to chaos, his Free Officers reasoned. The only way to secure the revolution was through a period of military dictatorship.

A series of incidents followed by political trials justified, in the eyes of the populace, the removal of all organized political opposition. Communists were held responsible for the August 1952 riots, in which workers seized control of a textile factory near Alexandria. Troops were sent in to restore order. Nine people were killed and 20 injured in the clashes that followed. After a court-martial, two agitators were sentenced to death and hanged the following day. By the end of 1954, 200 leading Communists were serving long sentences. Similarly, student riots in the early days of 1953 led to the arrest of leading politician including army officers, Communists a at Muslim Brothers, on charges of plotting Negu overthrow the Government, inciting Teade mutiny, subversion and corruption.

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The fact having been established th politi the regime was facing disruptive opposition ofth from the different political factions, requi tical next logical step was to abolish the partie On January 19, 1953, all parties with offru exception of the Muslim Brotherhow sitio which was reprieved as a religious organ invas world zation, were ordered to dissolve and ha over their funds. In October 1954, t he ha Brotherhood, too, was banned after one dust its members attempted to assassing work Nasser. The would-be assassin fired form shots (all of which missed their man remo while Nasser was speaking at a rally Alexandria. About 18,000 of the Brethn Maj were arrested. Seven were sentenced Ther death but the Supreme Guide, Hass came iorit Hodeiby, was reprieved and given a l sentence.

In the meantime, in June 1953, the matt monarchy had been abolished, and Egy was had become a republic. On January 2 that and 1953, Mohammed Neguib had announce ğle fo that a new political organization, the Liberation Rally, would replace the di solved political parties and that Gam deta Abdel Nasser would be its Secretary were General. Then, on February 10, a prov sional constitution had vested suprem authority in the leader of the revolution and the military committee.

## Power to Nasser

All these steps were paving the way in Nasser to assume power openly. But fir he had to get rid of Neguib, who was d manding more effective authority if n absolute control, and with whom he wa involved in a power struggle. Neguib wa no revolutionary; deeply conservative, b was at most a moderate reformer. The was an unbridgeable gap between this mi senior officer and the young revolutionarie who had raised him as their flag. He re garded them as rash and irresponsible, and their actions as ill-advised.

The masses who acclaimed Negul were, in reality, acclaiming the actions the rash anonymous young leader for whom he was a stand-in. To have handed over t Neguib would certainly have appeared t the people to have been a betrayal of the long struggle. Conveniently, the trial the Muslim Brothers revealed a connection between Neguib and the Brotherhood.<sup>H</sup> was dismissed on November 14, 1954, and placed under house arrest. Nasser emerged as effective head of state and president<sup>d</sup> the council of the revolution.

Motives behind call for democracy subject to interpretation