

declared by a friend who knew them well to have a "language confidential and a language official" ?—[See *Genet's letters*].—Is it ungenerous to suspect men who have been educated in the intriguing politics of France, to be capable of making formal dispatches to satisfy the publick, and of thwarting those dispatches by their *confidential* communications?

If, for example, it should be necessary to satisfy the British cabinet, and prevent an open rupture, that our administration should preserve the appearance of resistance to the unjust and abominable measures of France, is it not quite conceivable, that with the approbation of Mons. Champagny, an official note may be delivered by our minister, making a formal remonstrance to the decrees of France, in order to give fresh force to our complaints against Great-Britain ? It may be supposed, and our cabinet would have it believed, that France would not consent to such a system, inasmuch as she wished to involve us in an open war with England ; but I am persuaded it will appear that France is fully satisfied with the existing state of things ; that it gives her all the benefits she could hope to derive from our avowed alliance, without obliging her to any pecuniary sacrifices to maintain our cause.

Besides, this half way state between absolute alliance and dependence, and perfect independence, gives her the most favourable opportunity to draw very considerable revenue from us in the form of captures and seizures, which would be vastly more difficult in a state of avowed connection and amity.

This proposition I will venture to state without the dread of contradiction, that it will appear by a close and candid examination of these dispatches, (although they are artfully selected to impose upon the people) that the government of the United States have a perfect *private understanding* with France, and are determined to resist all the honourable and amicable proposals of Great Britain.

The first document published by our government, is a letter from Mr. Madison to Mr. Armstrong, dated May 22d, 1807 ;—and the first inquiry which occurs to us upon it, is, why this letter was not included in the communications of the president in the winter of 1803. when it was pretended that he communicated to congress all the correspondence of any importance between us and foreign courts, and if he had not so declared, it was his duty to have made publick such important papers, in which no matter requiring secrecy existed.

2dly. It appears that our administration chose to consider the Berlin decree as vague and uncertain as to its intentions, or as Mr. Madison in the *cabinet jargon* calls it, "*inarticulate*" and that they chose to presume, and did affect to presume, it was not intended to operate against us, though it is well known to every merchant's clerk, that we were the only neutral nation at that time, and the only one of course upon whom the decree could operate. Overlooking this notorious fact, as well understood by the government as by every body else, the cabinet go still