

arms have been constantly baffled or repulsed on shore; whilst at sea, with the exception of the capture of the Chesapeake, and one or two other affairs towards its conclusion, we have been equally unsuccessful. From what cause does this proceed? Not from any inferiority in courage or discipline, because in these particulars British soldiers and sailors will yield to none in the world. There must, then, be some other cause for these misfortunes, and the cause is surely one which has continually baffled all our plans of American warfare.

We have long been habituated to despise the Americans, as an enemy unworthy of serious regard. To this alone it is to be attributed, that frigates half manned were sent out to cope with ships capable of containing them within their hulls; and to this, also, the trifling handful of troops dispatched to conduct the war by land. Instead of fifteen hundred, had ten thousand men sailed from the Garonne under General Ross, how differently might he have acted! There would have been then no necessity for a re-embarkation after the capture of Washington, and consequently no time given for the defence of Baltimore; but marching across the country, he might have done to the one city what he did to the other. And it is thus only that a war with America can be suc-