On page 6 you refer to Czechoslovakia and compare it with the American intervention in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and also in Cuba. How can you come to such a conclusion and then say that the Russian intervention was a direct response to what Russia considered, rightly or wrongly, a threat emanating from NATO to Czechoslovakia from the communist orbit. Would you not agree at the same time that that was done by Russia mainly because they were losing control of political Czechoslovakia?

Professor McNaught: Yes, yes, I quite agree, and that of course is why the American interventions take place in Latin America. But the diplomatic argumentation on the Russian side has been that the NATO powers, particularly West Germany, have been luring Czechoslovakia away. Indeed, the Russian argument went well beyond that and said there was heavy infiltration. If I remember correctly, immediately before the August intervention a very great deal of space was given to the NATO war games by the Russian press. As I say, rightly or wrongly—they may be wrong in the fear—but the existence of NATO serves as a very effective justification for the maintenance of the Warsaw Pact and this kind of intervention.

• 1200 o rever and the reverse of that that the reverse of the state of the reverse of the rever

Mr. Laniel: An excuse, you mean.

Professor McNaught: An excuse.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MacLean: Mr. Chairman, on page 3 there is the expression "American slaughter in Viet Nam", and at the bottom of page 7

... we have no direct treaty obligations to support American agression . . .

and so on. There seems to be a thread throughout this paper that the Professor is vitally concerned with the morality of the United States in international affairs and rightly so, but to me the academic freedom for centuries, I suppose, has been based on the premise that academics search for truth.

To me these seem to be half-truths in the sense that there is no apparent concern about the international morality of other large countries—I am thinking of China and Russia as examples—and there seems to be a lack of concern about the right of independent nations to defend themselves against world communistic infiltration and the stirring up of trouble by international communist parties throughout the world. The presumption would be that the communist world no longer practices this sort of thing; they have suddenly reformed. When would this have taken place?

Professor McNaught: That is not my assumption. Obviously the Soviet Union is prepared to act unilaterally and militarily when it feels its immediate direct interest is threatened, but so is the United States and I assumed that in talking about non-alignment I would be concerning myself principally with the countries with which we are basically aligned. I think there is, of course, a right for independent nations to defend themselves, but we could bog down here for hours on the question of whether or not South Vietnam is an independent nation and on the precise sequence of the infiltration of non-Vietnamese troops.

All I can say in defence of my academic integrity in the matter is that some time ago I came to the conclusion that in fact the only foreign troops in any numbers in VietNam are American and their contributing allies and that this does, in fact, constitute invasion.

Mr. MacLean: You assume thereby that there is no objection to North Vietnamese troops being in South Viet Nam.

Professor McNaught: No more objection. sir, than there would be for troops from Catalonia to be in Valencia during the Spanish civil war. I regard the Vietnamese war in exactly the same way as the late President Kennedy did, that this is a civil war and therefore one will probably expect a movement back and forward of various sections of the Vietnamese people trying to resolve their problems. It is not an international boundary and the Geneva Accord spelled that out very precisely in 1954.

• 1205

Mr. MacLean: Therefore you would have to be able to say that there were no foreign troops in any part in Viet Nam.

Professor McNaught: Except for the American troops and the Australians and the South Koreans.

Mr. MacLean: You believe that this is so?

Professor McNaught: Yes.

Mr. MacLean: On page 6 there is a statement:

But it was an action of a sort that NATO was never designed to prevent; and it was an action which, in considerable degree, the existence of NATO made likely and possible.

This concerns the Czechoslovakian affair last summer. How, then, do you account for the *coup* in Czechoslovakia in 1947 before NATO existed.

Professor McNaught: In 1947, of course, central Europe was in a good deal more turmoil than it is now. It is an interesting fact in terms of historical statistics