

Some pointed out the inadequacies of the risk factors and doubted the assessment of their relative weight. Others asked whether differences in societies which run along the same cleavage exacerbate the risk of genocide as opposed to cross-cutting cleavages. In other words, whether there is a bigger risk of genocide in societies where differences (ethnic, religious, socio-economic, etc.) are concentrated within distinct groups as opposed to societies where differences (ethnic, religious, socio-economic, etc.) run across the distinct groups' identities? Gurr pointed out that evidence showing cross-cutting cleavages as preventing ethnic conflict is very weak. Harff added that the mobilisation of cleavages is more important than the differences themselves – which is among the reasons why democracy is the "trumping" condition most of the time. She also pointed out that the data are not as inaccessible as some suggested and can be acquired through several sources including published journal articles, and soon the University of Maryland website.

### **A United Nations Constabulary to Enforce the Law and Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity**

Mendlovitz emphasized the futility of indicting war criminals without convicting them and bringing them to justice. We are seeing the emergence of a robust normative code that should, if we had the means to implement it, create a global legal system. Yet in order for such a system to be achieved and sustained, we need to increase our capacity at the enforcement level. In response to this need, Mendlovitz envisions and recommends the formation of a United Nations constabulary, made up of 12,000-20,000 individually recruited public servants. The force would be lightly armed and trained to deal with crimes against humanity, rather than war crimes or crimes of aggression. The idea of "international citizenship" should apply to these individuals, such that their allegiance would be to the UN constabulary rather than to their country of origin. So as not to paralyse the force, the Secretary General would have the authority to engage it without the consensus of the Security Council.

Reactions centred around questions of the constabulary's mandate, its military capability, and its financing. Gurr cautioned against restricting the force's mandate to "crimes against humanity." Haines concurred, noting that it would also be difficult to define the "crimes against humanity" from which the force would be expected to protect people. Where does the international community have a legitimate right to intervene? Where would the line be drawn? he asked. In a similar vein, a lightly armed force would be limited in its capacity to protect and enforce: its mandate would necessarily be curtailed. Making reference to the chapters of the UN Charter, Haines warned against "injecting a Chapter 6 force into a Chapter 7 mandate." (Chapter 6 allows a UN force to resolve conflict by peaceful means, while Chapter 7 calls for the use of full force to restore international peace and security.)

These concerns were echoed by other participants. Armstrong-Whitworth questioned whether a lightly armed constabulary could really protect a safe haven, while Laurence stated categorically that it could not. He suggested that the constabulary could perform the task of monitoring, such as that which was tried and failed in Kosovo. This force might be useful before conflict or after it