

I. Introduction and Background

1. General Assembly Resolution 48/79 of 16 December 1993 requested the Secretary-General to establish a Group of Experts to prepare for a Review Conference on the *Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects* (the Certain Conventional Weapons or CCW Convention). Following the last session of this Group of Experts (8-19 August 1994), the Chair issued an integrated draft "rolling text" of amendments to Protocol II of the Convention (dealing with landmines, which has been the primary focus of the Group of Experts' deliberations). This rolling text, which records the state of negotiations regarding proposed amendments to the Convention and its Protocols, will be the basis for further discussions at the next session. The Review Conference is scheduled to take place sometime during the period 25 September to 13 October 1995.

2. The draft rolling text addresses several outstanding issues. To start, it reflects an ongoing concern with the scope of application of the Convention. Although many States recognize the importance of extending the scope of the Protocol to "non-international" conflict, as of the last session no agreement had been reached in this regard.

3. A proposal to amend the Convention to regulate not only use but also the *development, production, stockpiling and transfer* of landmines, while supported by several States, was not agreed by the Group and will be reviewed at the January 1995 session.

4. As reflected in the rolling text, no agreement has been reached regarding verification of either the Convention as a whole or Protocol II. Two basic views on the nature of future CCW verification are reflected in the rolling text. On the one hand, there is the view that an effective verification regime needs to be put in place if the Convention is to be meaningful. Adherents to this view agree that an effective verification system would be beneficial, but sometimes disagree over the precise nature of such a system (ie. its triggering mechanisms, screening procedures, etc.).

5. On the other hand, there is the view that an effective verification regime is neither necessary nor practicable. According to this view, such a regime would be problematic for several reasons: it would deter potential signatories from becoming parties to the Convention; it would be unduly intrusive; and it would violate national sovereignty. While some effort has been made to find common ground between these positions, at the moment there is no consensus on the issue of verification. This topic will be taken up again at the January session.

6. The Group also considered proposals to encourage the provision of technical and material assistance for de-mining. No agreement was reached with respect to this proposal.