

except to a destruction facility. Provisions to this effect are contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of article IV of the "rolling text". Moreover, the removal of chemical weapons from a store to a destruction facility must be conducted under international control. This provision, contained in the annex to article IV, section II, paragraph 6(b), has been agreed upon by all participants in the negotiations.

The implementation of these measures, which in essence would amount to the placing of chemical weapon stocks under "international arrest", would place all participants on an equal footing in terms of their security.

3. The authors of the proposal under consideration consider that the security of all States parties may be called into question either gradually (e.g. as a result of delays in the timetable or the destruction of the stockpiles as a result of material difficulties) or suddenly (e.g. the exit from the convention of one of the States parties or its refusal to continue with the elimination of the remaining stocks). Theoretically such situations may arise. However, the response to them should be different from that suggested by the authors of the proposal.

If a State begins to experience material or technical difficulties in the process of destroying its stocks, it should be granted assistance in order to ensure compliance with the schedule of destruction. It is another matter when a State refuses to continue destroying its stocks. This is a flagrant violation of the convention, with all the consequences that follow. This problem should be solved by creating an effective mechanism which would ensure compliance with the convention.

4. The French proposal does not solve the problem of preventing an exceptional situation connected with the possible withdrawal of a chemical-weapon State party from the convention and the unfreezing of its stocks. The paradox of the French proposal lies in the fact that, while calling for equal security for States parties to the convention, it may objectively increase the likelihood that such an exceptional situation will arise, in so far as the number of countries possessing chemical weapons will grow after the convention enters into force. It is one thing when all chemical weapon production facilities are closed and secured, and another when even one such facility remains. It will be an easy and rapid task to exceed the limits of "security stocks" by using this facility and its infrastructure. In this way the dangerous consequences of a State's