

By the Soviet Government's own admission in their May 10th proposals we know that the elimination of nuclear weapons cannot now be enforced. And, in his latest speech, Mr. Kuznetsov has not denied this. He has confidence in the progress of scientific research. So have we. Our draft resolution records our hopes on this point. But, until a solution has been found to the problem of control, we are not prepared to continue to seek a solution but we are most certainly not prepared to accept commitments which would be suicidal in the absence of safeguards which have yet to be devised.

The Western proposals on the levels of forces were explicitly related to the third element of the programme, effective inspection and control. On this point, the record is again illuminating. Never, and I emphasize the word never, have the Soviet representatives been prepared to explain exactly what they mean when they refer to inspection and control. Never have they given any indication that such schemes as they would be prepared to accept would be really effective and would warrant the confidence which alone makes it possible to achieve progress in this field. I am sure that we can make no progress in this matter until this fact is recognized.

Therefore, of the three elements in the United Nations programme, the U.S.S.R. have accepted one - that is, atomic prohibition - which on their own admission cannot at present be carried out. They have refused to go beyond unacceptable generalities about the third - that is, control - and they try to make much of their acceptance of the second, levels of forces, which, as we know, is related to the first objective and also to the third and was subject to conditions which the U.S.S.R. continues to disregard.

As we have maintained all along, peace can be assured through effective disarmament. Effective disarmament means adequate inspection and control. The Soviet reluctance on this point is ominous. It raises doubts whether effective inspection and control would not involve difficulties for the Soviet leaders because of their implications insofar as the Soviet system is concerned. It may be that an effective fool-proof disarmament scheme of the kind which the West wants, that is of the kind that will effectively give security to all, can only be had if the Soviet leaders are prepared to relax their monopoly over the minds of the peoples they control.

Such are, in broad terms, the result of difficult and intense negotiations on the subject of disarmament since the matter was last discussed in this Committee. As I see it, until the Summit Meeting, there had been a small but significant narrowing of the gap between the positions of the two opposing camps. Previous unacceptable propaganda proposals such as the immediate banning of the bomb had been abandoned and it seemed that, if agreement could have been reached over the details concerning levels of forces and inspection, at least the general framework of a practical scheme of disarmament could have been available. Particularly at the meetings of the Sub-Committee it had been possible to really come to grips with the core of the problem.

That it has accepted the three major elements of the programme recommended by the General Assembly: the elimination of nuclear weapons, reduction of armed forces and disarmament, effective inspection and control.