

preted, ultimately leads. The author has displayed an extraordinary patience and industry in tracing every idea of Kant from its first imperfect presentation until it has assumed a form beyond which Kant did not advance. Nor has he left the matter here, but has gone on to show the correction which must be made in the thought of Kant if we are to have a perfectly consistent and adequate theory. The immense educational value of such a book cannot be overestimated. Philosophical culture does not consist in an acquaintance with the results that have been reached by this or that thinker, but in the process of intellectual and spiritual development through which a man himself passes. It is reassuring to find the greatest living representative of English Idealism, as Professor Caird undoubtedly is, coming to the conclusion that the great reality of God—freedom and immortality—may be established upon a reasoned basis, but it is infinitely more important to make one's own every step in the process by which this assured conviction is reached.

Twelve years ago Professor Caird published his "Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant," the first work which put before the English reader the substance of the "Critique of Pure Reason," and indicated the lines on which the philosophy of Kant must be developed to a higher consistency. In his preface Mr. Caird held out a hope that at some future time he would complete the plan of the work in another volume on the ethical and æsthetical works of Kant, especially the "Critique of Practical Reason," and the "Critique of Judgment." That promise he has now more than fulfilled. During the interval he has not been idle. Besides critical papers on Wordsworth and Goethe, he has contributed two important articles to the "Encyclopædia Britannica"—"Cartesianism" and "Metaphysics"—and he has also published a work on "The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte," any one of which would have been sufficient to establish a reputation, and the last of which is a model of sympathetic statement and fair criticism. Returning to the subject of his first treatise, he has made an entirely new presentation of the metaphysical part of Kant's Philosophy, and to this he has added a critical account, not only of its ethical and æsthetic aspects, but of the other works of Kant, which may be regarded as illustrations or developments of his main argument, and especially of the important treatise on "Religion Within the Bounds of Mere Reason." The English reader is now for the first time in a position to estimate the ultimate scope and bearing of the critical philosophy, to see that "there is an unbroken continuity in the movement of Kant's thought, and that the lesson of his philosophy as a whole is definite and consistent."

Professor Caird has written the final exposition of Kant, and it would be superfluous for any English author to go over the same ground again. What is now needed is an independent statement of Idealism, and it is not, perhaps, too much to expect that Professor Caird, who has proved himself so great a master in exposition and criticism, will add to the obligations under which he has placed us by doing the work himself. There are clear indications that the present generation has lost faith in the old guides, and that the philosophy of the future must do justice at once to the truth of science and to

those great beliefs which give meaning and value to human life. No living author is so able to provide such a system of philosophy for us as Professor Caird.

It is impossible within the space at our command to give anything like an adequate idea of the philosophical wealth contained in this treatise. Perhaps we cannot do better than give a short statement of the valuable introductory chapter which contains an outline of Idealism as properly understood.

In a remarkable note to the "Critique of Pure Reason" Kant speaks of his own age as "the age of criticism." The term "criticism" is sometimes applied to the process of raising any objections that happen to strike the mind of the critic to the theory or doctrine under investigation. Such hap-hazard criticism is not what Kant had in his mind. Criticism he opposed on the one hand to dogmatism and on the other hand to scepticism. By dogmatism, as he tells us, is meant "the positive or dogmatic procedure of reason without previous criticism of its own faculty." Assuming the possibility of knowledge the dogmatist "seizes upon some general principle that seems to be as wide as the universe itself" and uses it without doubt or hesitation to explain all things. But the principle at first employed is inevitably inadequate to its task, and when this is seen doubt is apt to fall upon truth itself. A particular principle, true within its limited range, is employed as if it were an "open sesame" for the whole universe, and hence the dogmatist who has a perception of the complementary truth is easily able to show that his opponent contradicts himself. But as the same objection can be retorted upon himself it seems as if no principle rested upon a solid basis. Thus arises scepticism or the conviction that "whatever can be asserted may with equal reason be denied." Now Kant maintains that scepticism, like dogmatism, carries within it the principle of its own refutation. It is really because the sceptic tacitly appeals to a principle common to the contending parties that he is able to show that they refute each other. The aim of criticism is to bring the controversy to an end by detecting its sources and pre-suppositions, to penetrate to the principle which underlies the controversy, to discover the more comprehensive conception which puts each of the opposing theories in its place as an element of the truth; and the critical philosophy goes beyond this only in so far as it is an attempt to reach principles which are prior to all controversy.

This conception of the problem of philosophy must not be confused with Locke's doctrine, that we "must take a view of our own understanding, examine our own powers and see to what things they are adapted." For we have no other faculties by which we can examine the mind but the mind itself, and if our faculties are not adapted to the discovery of truth in other regions they cannot reveal to us the true nature of our own powers. Locke, in fact, saws away the branch on which he is himself sitting. Mind is not an object that can be separated from nature and understood purely by itself. "For man is a being who doubly presupposes nature, as he is a spirit which finds its organ in an animal body, and as it is in the system of nature that he finds the presupposition and environment of his life." Man, however, is not merely an