

The process of judging may be brief and simple or prolonged and intricate. In either case it involves four steps: first, fastening attention upon the materials at hand; second, reflecting upon them in order to see to what result they point; third, deciding as to their logical relation; and fourth, expressing the result in suitable language. The materials of the judgment may come through personal observation or through testimony concerning the observations of others. To prepare the child for judgments in actual life, these materials must resemble as nearly as possible the conditions of actual life. Such materials are found in history, and found there in greater degree than in any other subject. For history is, indeed, "past politics," as Mr. Freeman avers: but it is much more—it is past life. In teaching history aright we are simply giving the pupils the means of reaching conclusions about the experience of their predecessors in precisely the same way in which they will be called upon in their own future to form judgments about their own experience and that of their contemporaries. The second step, reflection, involves some volition. The irrelevant must be set aside; what is pertinent must be given its full weight. Things that resemble each other must be noted; things that differ must be discriminated. How finely the facts of history give the teacher opportunity to direct such activities as these! In the third step, the formation of the decision, feeling and inclination must be repressed. The youth must be led to decide, not as he wishes, but as the facts reveal the truth to be. Respecting the last step, expression, history is no better than any other subject that compels close thinking. Clear expression aids clear thinking in every subject, and should be insisted on as a part of the process. Moreover, it is only through an examina-

tion of the expression of the judgment that we can tell whether the process of judging has been clear, accurate, prompt, and independent, and whether it gives promise of stability.

Since history is thus an excellent means of training judgment, and since reasoning is simply passing from certain judgments to certain other judgments, it follows that history is an excellent means of training in reasoning. Furthermore let us remember that reasoning about facts of one kind may not develop power to reason accurately about a different kind of facts. There are those who hold that there is no such thing as training in reasoning apart from the contents of the judgments from which and to which we pass in the process. If this be true, and I am inclined to accept it, history is certainly the best means by which to develop the power of reasoning about the conduct of everyday life by individuals or by institutions.

From the foregoing it seems possible to declare that in secondary education there is no subject which offers a better field for the training of imagination, judgment and reasoning, applied to social, ethical, and political considerations, than the subject of history.

This intellectual service, however, is not all that should be claimed from history. "The education of the knowing faculties," said President Thomas Hill, "is a very imperfect and unimportant culture, unless we at the same time impart the power of expression and of action, and awake sentiments and feelings worthy to be expressed and embodied." The graduate of the secondary school ought not only to be wise, but, so far as we can influence him, to be good. The training of the judgment should be moral as well as intellectual, and should lead to discipline of the will. History is