

lemma might be escaped, if the fact and the fancy entering into current evolutionism were kept apart and dealt out separately. The mind's natural craving for knowledge could then be satisfied without detriment; for it is only when science is adulterated with nescience that it becomes unwholesome and poisonous.

The object of the present volume is to distinguish between science and speculation in the application of Darwinism to morals. The results of evolutionary science in the domain of matter and in the domain of life are everywhere taken for granted; the philosophical and, more especially, the ethical theories currently associated with them are subjected to the most searching scrutiny I have been able to make. As it has been pretended that the doctrine of evolution invests ethics with a new *scientific* character, I first examine the various methods of ethics and attempt to determine under what conditions alone ethics can become a *science*. (*This first chapter should be omitted by the general reader not interested in the logic of ethics.*) Whether Darwinian ethics is a piece of science or of speculation appears in the sequel. But before the question is decided we must know what is meant by Darwinism. Accordingly, the second chapter gives an exposi-