

"warning." The massive invasion had begun over 12 hours earlier. Furthermore, Lie had learned about the attack from the US, through a midnight call on June 24 from the US Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization. After receiving confirmation from UN field observers, the Secretary-General did at least validate the allegations of aggression (a useful contribution in itself) and implored the Council to take action (which it did because the Soviet Union was absent and therefore unable to use its veto right).

It was only with the arrival of the proactive Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold that Article 99 was applied vigorously and rigorously. The most important case was in the Congo. In January 1960, Hammarskjold made a tour of many African states, especially the newly emerging states. He personally found that the Congo, due to receive its independence from Belgium a few months later, was ill-prepared for self-government.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, the UN's Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations raised serious doubts about "the future of the new republic as an integrated nation."<sup>7</sup> Demonstrating his ability to "meet trouble half way," he sent his very capable Undersecretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Ralph J. Bunche, to represent the UN at the Congolese independence ceremonies on June 30. Using intentionally vague wording, Hammarskjold gave Bunche a mandate to "be available to the [Congolese government] for consultations and discussions on matters relating to the United Nations interest ... [and] to report directly to me, with such recommendations as you may consider suitable."<sup>8</sup> When Bunche cabled back his first-hand observations of the outbreak of violence—he himself had been held at gun point—and described his frequent discussions with the new government leaders, Hammarskjold had an excellent source of on-site information.<sup>9</sup> On July 12, when the Congolese leaders requested Hammarskjold to intervene, he was already quite familiar with the situation. He called an urgent meeting of the Security Council for July 13, 1960, where he described the situation and presented his proposal. At the meeting, he said: "I believe the UN may be able to save this situation, chaotic as it is rapidly becoming."<sup>10</sup> The danger had broad, global implications since the superpowers supported opposing factions in the Congo, which could easily have become a flash point. At Hammarskjold's recommendation, the Security Council created a peace-keeping force, called ONUC (Force de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo) which played a difficult but stabilizing role over the next four years.

Secretary-General U Thant was a strong proponent and practitioner of "quiet diplomacy" and he never invoked Article 99 explicitly. At times he was urged to do so by various governments and outside observers (e.g., in the Biafran/Nigeria conflict 1967-70), but he resisted because he felt that matters should only be brought before the Council if agreement on action was likely to be achieved, something which was not easy in the polarized Security Council of the Cold War. He insisted that "nothing could be more divisive or useless than for the