

Well-documented examples of historico-societal influences on strategic choices abound. Several scholars, for example, have examined the cultural and institutional influences on pre-1914 military doctrines, when many European forces adopted offensive postures (such as *guerre à l'outrance*) that cost them dearly in blood and treasure, and that were shockingly inflexible in light of the early battlefield experience. The reasons for these doctrines can be found in the organizational or institutional interests of professional military organizations that were not under civilian control or in the social stratification of European societies and social orders (both of which are "social structural" explanations).³⁷ This literature has been generalized beyond Europe, with excellent recent studies of Chinese strategic culture, of Indian society and military power, and of Japanese political/military culture, but in almost none of these cases have analysts stepped beyond limited conceptions of military doctrine and strategy to address broader issues of a society's or state's orientation towards how best to achieve its security, including the arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament dimensions of security-building measures that are the direct concern of this study.³⁸

The second, external, face of strategy also has cultural aspects. These are simultaneously more problematic and more germane to this study, and they can be grouped under the headings of "strategy and ethnocentrism" or "strategy and identity." The ethnocentric biases of strategy, which include a tendency to adopt crude images of the enemy, to polarize disputes, to misunderstand the impact of one's own actions, and to assume a posture of superiority, all represent "important sources of mistakes in the theory and practice of strategy."³⁹ Of course, how potential allies and opponents are regarded is connected to deeper questions of "identity" in a strong sense -- is your potential opponent considered an equal, an inferior, a "brother enemy," or a barely human barbarian? Few of the simplistic generalizations stand up to scrutiny here, and the ability of groups who "understand" each other perfectly well in historical, cultural, social and linguistic terms to kill each other appear no less than that of groups living across wide gulfs of mutual incomprehension. In fact, it might be that the most bitter struggles take place between peoples who understand perfectly the nature of their adversaries.

Nevertheless, despite the slipperiness of concepts such as an "enemy image" or ethnocentrism, it is still important to assess the degree to which concepts of security and strategic culture might be affected by the existence (or not) of regional affinity communities (linguistic, ethnic, religious, racial). It seems intuitively plausible that the spreading of the notion of a common "European identity" played some role in ensuring the success of confidence and security-building measures in Europe over the last two decades. Similar effects may be at work in other regions, such as Latin America, or Southeast Asia, while their opposite might be unfolding in the Middle East.

³⁷ Stephen van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914," *World Politics* 38 (1986), 80-117; Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *International Security* 9 (1984), 108-146; Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). On French doctrine in the interwar period, see Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II," in Katzenstein, *Culture and National Security*, 186-215.

³⁸ In addition to the works by Stephen Peter Rosen and Elizabeth Kier cited above, see also Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan," in Katzenstein, *Culture and National Security*, 317-356; Alastair Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

³⁹ Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 18, 20-62.