

another country; timing of open displays; and planned OSIs. The movement notifications alone involve most significant activities associated with the transit of TLIs. The START notifications will alert a variety of NTM monitoring systems which can be focused on specific activities, thus enhancing their effectiveness. In addition, the combination of the START notifications of flight tests and the provisions in the agreement calling for no denial of telemetric data contribute significantly to the effectiveness of NTM.

NTM/ITM/MTM and OSIs. The synergistic effects between NTM/ITM/MTM and OSIs are very high in both directions. Information from NTM/ITM/MTM can be used to trigger, focus, and evaluate OSIs. OSIs can provide "ground truth" for a variety of NTM/ITM/MTM systems which reinforces their credibility. In the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), for example, while NTM/ITM/MTM could not see inside buildings where suspected illegal activities were taking place, OSIs provided access to the internal facilities and activities; combining these two sources of information clearly enhanced knowledge and thus overall verification of Iraqi activities. This example also applies to arms control verification regimes.

Verification regimes associated with the TTBT and PNET include OSIs utilizing complex technical equipment such as CORRTEX. These inspections and technical measurements provide valuable data for calibrating NTM's seismic measurements. NTM can provide the information necessary for directing the location and timing of the OSIs.

While NTM can provide information on the activities which will be covered by OSIs in the START agreement, confirming and/or correcting NTM data by OSIs gives the necessary precision to ensure effective verification and at the same time gives a basis for improving future NTM capabilities. Similarly, NTM data lends credence or raises questions about

information obtained by OSI which cannot be otherwise verified, for example, the suspected presence of illegal activities within a facility. The net result of these very strong synergistic effects is enhanced verification and confidence in compliance with the agreement.

NTM/ITM/MTM and Aerial Surveillance.

Information from NTM/ITM/MTM can be used to target aerial surveillance flights. Such flights can frequently cover sites which may not be accessible on a timely basis by NTM/ITM/MTM systems. They can fill in gaps in NTM/ITM/MTM coverage by operating at lower altitudes, often under the weather, at times when NTM/ITM/MTM will not be within the detection or observation range of the suspect activity. Aerial inspections also allow for real-time interaction between a sensing device and an inspector, and they permit release of data without compromising sensitive sources and methods. Open Skies' wide area coverage of a variety of locations on a timely basis complements NTM/ITM/MTM and aerial inspections, and it also avoids the concerns associated with sensitive sources and methods.

NTM/ITM/MTM and CBMs. CBMs are likely to become increasingly important to transparency and openness and, in turn, to arms control verification. There are some synergies among notifications, information exchanges, and observations which should be taken into account. In the side agreement to START regarding nuclear-armed SLCMs, for example, there is a requirement for unilateral declarations of the numbers of such weapons in order to affirm compliance with the overall nuclear-armed SLCM quota; these declarations, which are one form of CBMs, can be supported by NTM.

CBMs contained in the 1986 Stockholm Document include calendars of military events such as major exercises and invitational observations of such activities; the data drawn

