

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

It should also be noted that the ultimate objective of the proposed convention is the institution of a general legal system under which the various States would give specific, verifiable undertakings. They would assume these commitments on the understanding that the other States parties would follow suit. Voluntary participation in such a system must be based on the conviction of every State party that, in the event of its security being endangered as a result of the non-fulfilment of commitments by any other State party, there would definitely be a body to which appeal could be made. That body could only be the group of States in association with which the injured State entered into specific commitments, on the understanding that the group would be responsible for upholding the convention and ensuring its observance.

To that end, stipulation of the possibility of convening a special meeting of the consultative committee if the fact-finding team is unable to solve a problem relating to the observance of the provisions of the convention, as mentioned in the draft submitted by the United States of America, merely constitutes a proper application of the principle of the collective joint responsibility of the States parties to uphold the convention and endeavour to ensure the observance of its provisions.

However, we believe that the provision concerning the convening of the consultative committee to consider a matter relating to the violation of the stipulations of the convention should comprise an indication of the legal framework within which the consultative committee can act. Since the consultative committee consists of all the States parties, specific provision should be made for a commitment on their part to assist any State whose security is endangered or which is otherwise prejudiced as a result of the violation of the provisions of the Convention by any States party. In parallel, a stipulation should be made to the effect that the State parties must take action to ensure observance of the convention and fulfilment of the commitments specified therein.

Furthermore, it is possible to envisage circumstances in which the convention, the legal system that it establishes or the legal principles that it lays down might be endangered, but not necessarily as a result of a breach committed by one of the States parties. In such a situation the Security Council might, once again, be convened, particularly if the matter relates to a circumstance which poses a threat to international peace or security. In addition, however, it might also be necessary to convene an urgent meeting of the consultative committee. In this connection, we believe that there must be some form of guarantee of the serious nature of such convocation for which we have therefore stipulated the concurrence of a number of States parties, for example, five.

These are the concepts that we believe should be incorporated in the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons in order that the convention may acquire the credibility and effectiveness needed to make it truly capable of fulfilling our aspiration, namely, the final elimination of such weapons and the exclusion of their use in any form whatsoever.