

15. CBMs provide reassurance of good intentions through (1) the continuous public demonstration of non-aggressive military postures and (2) the enhancement of crisis management capabilities commensurate with the reduction of the danger of surprise attack.
16. There are two types of CBMs: (1) those that address a willingness to demonstrate non-aggressiveness through openness; and (2) those that reduce concerns about surprise attack warning.
17. There are two directions in which CBMs can go: (1) military detente and (2) crisis reduction (by preventing defensive military moves from being misinterpreted as impending preparations for a surprise attack). (This second direction is close to classic arms control.)
18. The objective of CBMs is to alter perceptions in order to lead to correct interpretations of intentions.
19. The focus of CBMs is on the factors that shape each side's perceptions of the other side.
20. CBMs operate on the perceptions of those in confrontation (and particularly on their perceptions of intentions).
21. The major purpose of CBMs in a crisis is to re-establish communications.
22. CBMs make (should make) military intentions explicit.
23. CBMs provide reassurance about intentions through opportunities to ascertain important information relating to military activities.
24. CBMs permit (or should permit) us to differentiate between hostile action and the normal "noise" of military activity.
25. CBMs do not directly affect the size, the weaponry and the structure of armed forces. They only restrict the availability of forces, their activities, and their deployments in certain areas.
26. CBMs leave military forces and their existing composition intact.
27. CBMs reduce threat perception (by demonstrating that the perceptions are wrong) and reduce threat options (by restricting the use of existing forces). CBMs do *not* include any measures that would actually reduce military capabilities.
28. CBMs are *not* arms control measures.
29. CBMs are pre-arms control measures – they (can) facilitate arms control and disarmament agreements.
30. Any CBMs that directly and obviously reduce the chance of war are undeniably an arms control measure.
31. The degree of confidence depends primarily upon the degree of *openness* and *transparency*. [These terms are important but confusing. Bomsdorf explains them in the following way: "Transparency is one of the key concepts, if not *the* key to the Western approach to confidence-building measures, which are intended to make the other side's military strategy and practice transparent. This is to enable inferences to be drawn as to its attitude and to make it more predictable and calculable. ... East Bloc countries ... reject Western demands for transparency, or *prozracnost*, because accepting them would, it is argued, be tantamount to legalizing espionage. Instead, Eastern delegates use the term openness, or *otkrovennost*, both as a formula of rejection and as basic concept of the East's views on confidence-building measures. In the West there is a widespread tendency to ignore this distinction and regard transparency and openness as synonymous. ... Transparency is a concept to which objective criteria apply and does not come in degrees. ... Openness, in contrast, is a concept that can be influenced by subjective factors. How open one is will always depend upon how open one is prepared to be." This careful distinction is seldom discussed and is typical of the carelessness that attends the translation of terms with specific meanings. Although Bomsdorf appears to be incorrect on the matter of transparency having no degrees, his larger point about complete versus relative openness is well taken.⁴³

59

⁴³ Falk Bomsdorf, "The Confidence-Building Offensive in the United Nations," *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 376-377.

