

government considered whether any part of the Canadian army should be despatched to Korea for immediate action. Having in mind other obligations for the employment of Canadian ground forces and the uncertainties of the whole world situation, we reached the conclusion that the despatch, at this stage, of existing first line elements of the Canadian army to the Korean theatre would not be warranted. I announced that decision on July 19 and that remains the view of the government.

Let me tell you why. Since our wartime forces were demobilized we have not attempted to maintain, in the Canadian army, a fully trained expeditionary force available for immediate action outside Canada.

We wanted to get the best value we could for the Canadian taxpayers' defence dollars; and for the army, the first requirements were for our immediate territorial defence and for a basic training establishment. We have developed an air-borne brigade group highly trained for operations in the North and designed to share in the immediate protection of this continent. We have also maintained an establishment for the rapid expansion of the Canadian army in the event of a general war.

But, at this time, we have no expeditionary force in being. Moreover, before the aggression in Korea, no definite plans existed for the creation of a United Nations force. And that was certainly not the fault of Canada. As early as 1946 I myself stated to the Assembly of the United Nations that the people of Canada were anxious to know what military contribution they would be expected to make to the international forces to be established under the United Nations Charter. But, in spite of its obligations under the Charter, the Soviet Union, by its wilful obstruction, prevented an international force from being set up.

The action taken by the United Nations in respect of Korea is in fact its first effective attempt to organize an international force to stop aggression. In consequence, the government and the people of Canada were faced with two questions. First, how much and in what way should we contribute to the United Nations police action in Korea and, secondly, how much and in what way could we increase our ability to participate in other common efforts, either under the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty.

We have considered several possible courses. It was not too difficult to decide that some courses would certainly be unwise, but it has been much less easy to determine what positive course is likely to be most effective.

I have already said we could not send the trained brigade group, or any worthwhile part of it, to Korea without dangerously weakening our own immediate defences.

There has been talk of a United Nations Police Division of Volunteers and this may in time work out, and be of value for areas other than Korea. If and when such a division is formed along lines considered practicable, the government will recommend appropriate Canadian participation.

But we feel the present situation calls for something more immediate. The government has therefore authorized the recruitment of an additional army brigade which is beginning on Wednesday. This brigade will be known as the Canadian Army Special Force and it will be specially trained and equipped to be available for use in carrying out Canada's obligations under the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Pact. Naturally, this brigade will, subject to the approval of Parliament, be available for service in