

heavy fire as will enable the second line to approach the point selected for attack and drive him from it.

"The supports and reserves keep the firing line at its most efficient strength by filling the gaps caused by the casualties, protect its flanks by the fire they can bring to bear upon any troops which threaten them, and encourage those engaged in front by the feeling that there is a body of comrades following to assist them. As the final stage is reached, the supports and reserves become absorbed in the extended line.

"During the advance all serious flank attacks must be met by the reserves, which will also find any troops required for the long range fire.

"The second line assaults the position when its way is prepared through the losses inflicted upon the enemy by the first line.

"The third line either confirms the success or covers the retreat of the first and second lines, and so prevents defeat from becoming disaster.

"In the final stage of the attack, as the firing line nears the enemy's position, and cannot advance further without unnecessary exposure, a convenient position should be selected whence a telling fire may be brought to bear upon the points of the enemy's position selected for attack. Should the reserve be still in rear, it should now join the front line, so as to bring its fire up to the maximum of effect.

"The second line, well kept in hand, should now be led up to the firing line, opposite the selected points of the hostile line, where, from the concentrated fire of the artillery and of the firing line, the defenders must have suffered most. On reaching the firing line the second line will double through it with cheers, carrying the position at the point of the bayonet, the drums beating and bugles playing. The firing line will follow close in rear.

"The third line, formed in the most convenient manner according to local circumstances, will work forward ready to support the attack, to meet the enemy's reserves if a serious counter attack is made when the assault is delivered, and subsequently to confirm the success of the attack by opening a heavy fire upon the enemy as he retreats, or by the mere occupation of the captured position."

The memorandum deals in detail with the formation for a battalion acting alone, battalions in brigades and divisions, and with the mode of reinforcing. In advancing upon a position three zones are described, the first from 3,000 up to 1,700 yards, subject to artillery fire and rifle fire at extreme ranges; the second at from 1,700 to 800 yards, swept by artillery fire and unaimed rifle fire at long ranges; and the third, in two phases—the first from 800 to 150 yards, swept by aimed rifle fire, at medium and short ranges; and the second phase from 150 yards up to the position in which independent firing will be used with fixed sights, the second line joining the first for the final charge, which must be carried out with vigour, the men cheering loudly, drums beating, and bugles sounding. The third line following rapidly will, when the position is carried, open fire by volleys on the enemy as he retires.

### Lord Wolseley on Military Genius.

(Admiralty and Horse Guards Gazette.)

In the number of the *Fortnightly Review* for this month there is an article by Lord Wolseley on the various qualities which distinguish the born military commander, the General whose soldiers will follow him with absolute confidence, and who is worthy of their trust. It is an instructive contribution to the discussion of the question how far great men have made their age, and how far they are merely the outcome of their time, products of natural laws, and merely instruments whereby great forces are applied. There are a number of other subjects touched upon by Lord Wolseley in this article, but the main purpose, apparently, that he has in view is to impress the fact that a great genius at the head of an army can do nearly as much in our time as Napoleon or Cæsar did in theirs. "The history of the Franco-German war," he writes, "has led some readers to imagine that, as war is now conducted—namely by a whole armed nation pieced together to form one great fighting machine—there is no longer the same room for the action and influence of one great commander as was the case in all former times." What Wolseley's own view is will be seen from the following passage:

"The Emperor William was a thorough soldier in all his instincts, and was wise enough to know that, as a general, he was no Marlborough, no Napoleon. He possessed the talent to recognize the power and wisdom of the able servants with whom Providence had provided him, and he had the courage—rare with princes—to trust them fully. The precise mode in which that great trinity, the King, Bismarck and Moltke worked together is, and must long continue to be, a mystery to all outsiders, but it worked as one man, as one directing mind. It took the place and fulfilled the functions which in all other armies, and in all other times, has been the *role* of one great general."

Lord Wolseley asks whether the history of the last twenty years could be written intelligibly if the figures of Cavour and Bismarck were omitted from its pages. More pertinently he says:—Should we ever have had the crusades had Peter the Hermit never been born?" and he remarks:—

"If Wellington in early life had accepted the small post in the Irish Excise which his family pressed him to take, or after Talavera had he resigned his command in disgust with the interference of Ministers, as ignorant of war as he was of theology, Napoleon would, in all human probability, have died in peace and triumph at the Tuileries. After Sir John Moore's death, there was no English general save Wellington. In the same way, a hundred years before, Marlborough was our only commander who was fit to cope with Villars and the other marshals of France at that time. In Anne's reign, the Grand Alliance, which may be said to have saved European liberty, could have only been kept together by the tact and military genius of Marlborough. It was his great ability in the field that secured the independence of Holland, that saved Europe from the grasp of the great French king, as she was saved a century later from the tyranny of the great Corsican, by another illustrious British soldier."

The views expressed by the writer on Wellington's character are of great interest, but will be certain to excite controversy. Lord Wolseley believes him to have been deficient in the greatest quality of the commander—the "personal magnetism" possessed by Cæsar, Hannibal, Marlborough, Napoleon and General Lee. He speaks of his "just reasoning power," but says he was a "thorough aristocrat at heart," believing that the British soldier was only invincible "when restrained by the most rigorous discipline and led by English gentlemen." The marvellous magnetic power of the great, generous leader over his men was certainly undervalued by Wellington. He used to say that Waterloo was won in the playgrounds of Eton and Harrow, and no man has ever set a higher value upon good breeding and blue blood in officers than he did. "There was," says Lord Wolseley, "no genial sympathy between him and his soldiers; they respected him, and, during his later campaigns, they had the most unbounded confidence in his military genius, but beyond his own immediate military household, with whom he lived on terms of intimacy, no one loved him. It is for this reason that I think he will never be classed in the same rank of military greatness—of real military genius—with the five great leaders of men I have named above. Military genius may be possessed by many men who are in no sense of the word great commanders":—

"Military genius in its highest sense is a combination of many qualities and powers. A man may shine as an eminent military historian, and yet be wanting in some of the simple attributes without which no man can even be a good private soldier. In fact, he need not be a soldier at all. Mr. Kinglake and Thomas Carlyle have shown genius in describing actions in which they had no share. Sir William Napier, though a soldier, made his type of genius most felt as a military historian. Strategy, as a science, can be learnt from illustrations drawn in chalk on a blackboard; and an able man who has mastered its rules and laws, and who is thoroughly well versed in military history, may write valuable works on it, although he may be entirely destitute of that sound and clear judgment without which no general can be worth anything in the field. Jomini, the greatest of writers on tactics, never held any independent command in war."

The author discusses very briefly the relative influences exercised by the poet and the great leader of men on the events of the world. Naturally he declines to decide whether the British nation owes more to Byron than to Wellington, or whether Germany is more indebted to Heine than to Bismarck; but he affirms that, in dwelling on the gifts of the imagination, we are apt to forget the benefits we have received from men of action. Insisting on the need of great application if even a born military genius is to succeed and be converted into a victorious commander, Lord Wolseley points the moral by a reference to the American war:—

"In the war between the Northern and Southern states of America, both armies were composed of great masses of newly-raised levies. Heaven-born genius, unallied with military education and knowledge, had therefore the best chance of making itself felt, and of coming to the front. Yet what is the lesson the history of that war teaches us? All those whose names will be for ever remembered in connection with it by the English-speaking race throughout the world were educated soldiers. Lee and Grant, Stonewall Jackson, Sherman, McClellan, Sheridan, Longstreet, Johnston, Hill, and a host of others, whose names are and will long be household words in their own states, were all graduates of West Point, that most excellent of military colleges."

Besides education, and absolute coolness in danger, which was Marlborough's greatest characteristic, Lord Wolseley believes that the great commander should be able to "calculate chances," and this can only be done by a free exercise of the imagination. Wellington, for example, said that he had spent his life in trying to imagine what was