

ledge, the categories, and the schemata ; the fourth to the relations of metaphysic and psychology, and to Mr. Lewes's theory of knowledge ; the fifth and sixth to the principles of judgment, and Dr. Sterling's view of them ; the seventh to Mr. Balfour's objections to Kant's proof of substantiality, and Dr. Sterling's view of the proof of causality ; the eighth to the metaphysic of Nature ; the ninth and tenth to Mr. Spencer's conceptions of Nature, and of Phenomena and Noumena ; and the last two chapters to an attempt to show that Kant's theory of knowledge, while right in principle, is wanting in unity and completeness. This is a wide territory, but our author traverses it with the ease of one who has made himself thoroughly familiar with the whole ground.

While our own attitude towards Prof. Watson's conclusions is, in the main, one of agreement, we feel compelled at the same time to dissent from some of his criticism, especially that directed against the views of Mr. Spencer, much of which appears to us to be founded on misapprehensions of that writer's meaning. Moreover, Prof. Watson shows a tendency to unduly emphasise the differences between the views of the two philosophers whose ideas he is contrasting. After all, Kant, though usually classed as an Idealist, was a Realist to the extent at least of believing in the actual existence of things in themselves : while, on the other hand, Mr. Spencer, though a Realist in the same sense, is an Idealist to the extent of believing that we cannot know things in themselves, and that our knowledge is only (to use Prof. Watson's own words as applied to Kant) of ' objects constructed out of impressions of sense, as brought under the forms of our perception ' (p. 51). Where there is substantial harmony on two points of so fundamental a nature, it seems hardly worth while to lay very much stress upon mere minor differences.

It may be worth while here to enlarge a little on one or two points on which we are at odds with Prof. Watson, with respect to his strictures on Mr. Spencer's views. With regard, for instance, to Mr. Spencer's contention that an Unknowable Absolute exists, Prof. Watson objects : ' If there is no knowledge of the absolute, we have no right to predicate its existence ' (p. 306). Why not ? A man born blind may at some particular instant be conscious of something touching

his hand. *What it is he does not know.* It may be a brick wall, or a piece of wood, or something held by another person. Because the blind man does not know *what it is* he feels, is he therefore precluded from predicating that *something* is touching him ? By no means. The illustration is a rough and ready one, but it will serve our purpose. A change takes place at some particular instant in a human consciousness : the change must have a cause : something in consciousness proclaims that the change was not self-determined : therefore—and the inference would be irresistible to ninety-nine men out of every hundred, to all, probably, who are not metaphysicians—the change must have been produced by an external something, that is, a Noumenon or Absolute. What that something is we do not know ; all we know is, that of which we are conscious, namely, the sensation or representation, or, as Mr. Spencer would say, the symbol of the unknown reality. One of the conclusions which some Idealists appear to have reached is, that Reality cannot exist apart from Intelligence. On this point the metaphysical argument may be met by a physical one. Geologists tell us that a time was, at a remote period in the history of the earth, when neither man nor any other animal existed on it. Apart from revelation, then, and dealing with the subject not theologically, but philosophically, it may be confidently asserted that, at that time, no intelligence existed on the earth, or, for all we know, any where else in the universe. Does any one doubt that a noumenal universe existed then, although, so far as we know or can prove, no intelligence existed capable either of knowing a phenomenal universe, or of imagining an ideal one ?

Mr. Spencer's argument, which also falls under Prof. Watson's strictures, respecting the existence and unknowability of the mind, as a thing in itself, is similar to the foregoing. Feeling or knowledge is experienced. But feeling and knowledge are not entities, suspended, naked and unadorned, *in vacuo*. It is impossible so to conceive them. The inference is irresistible that there must be something which feels or knows. What the nature of that something is, in other words, what is the nature of mind, we do not know. The mind being the *instrument* of knowledge, cannot be an *object* of knowledge. A knife cannot cut itself, nor can an eye see itself.