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POLAND.

March 2, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

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Copy No. 068a

Mr. O'Malley to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 20.)
Sir,

British Embassy to Poland,
London, February 27, 1943.

I HAVE the honour to report that to-day's issue of the *Dziennik Polski*—the Government-controlled daily paper produced in London—contains the text of a resolution passed at a meeting held on the 25th February and presided over by General Sikorski. A correct translation of this appears in *The Times* of the 26th February, and a copy of this is enclosed herein.

2. The second paragraph of this resolution says that "the Polish Government repudiates most definitely the malicious propaganda which accuses Poland of indirect or direct inimical tendencies towards Soviet Russia. It is absolutely absurd to suspect Poland of intentions to base the eastern boundaries of the Polish Republic on the Dnieper and the Black Sea or to impute to Poland any tendencies to move her frontier farther to the east." The words "malicious propaganda" obviously refer to an article which originally appeared in the *Radyanska Ukraina* of the 20th February and was reproduced prominently in the *Moscow Pravda* of the following day. This article was subsequently broadcast abroad by the Tass Agency, and a copy of Tass's version of it forms the second enclosure to this despatch.

3. These recriminations are the outward and visible sign of a growing tension in Russo-Polish relations arising principally, and according to Polish accounts, from the decision of the Russian Government communicated to the Polish Embassy at Kuibyshev on the 16th January of this year, to treat as citizens of the Soviet Union all Poles who were at the time in that part of Poland which fell to Russia under the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement, and to close down all those Polish agencies which were up till that date ministering to the relief of Polish refugees and deportees in Soviet territory. As this tension may very well grow more rather than less acute during the next few months, it might perhaps be worth while to record the observations made on it by the numerous Polish officials with whom I have come in contact since I assumed charge of this embassy: such, for instance, as General Sikorski, Count Raczynski, M. Mikolajczyk, the Deputy Prime Minister, M. Grabski, President of the National Council, M. Lipski, one of the Prime Minister's personal assistants, not to mention others occupying less important positions.

4. The main lines of the Polish thesis, as set forth to me in the freedom of informal and friendly conversation, are as follows: The Poles begin by saying that there can be no question about their genuine desire to co-operate as fully as possible with the Russians in the prosecution of the war, since a rapid and overwhelming defeat of Germany is manifestly a prerequisite condition of a secure and independent Poland. On the other hand, they say that complete silence and passivity is impossible in the face of Russian provocation (of which the *Pravda* article is cited as an example), and of the intention which the Soviet Government seem in Polish eyes now gradually to be revealing eventually to refuse to recognise as part of an independent Poland any territory lying to the east of the Ribbentrop-Molotov line. Silence and passivity would fatally undermine the position of General Sikorski and of his Government in Poland itself. They assert that if, when a victorious Russian army reached Warsaw, the Russian Government still attempted to give effect to decisions of the 16th January last, it would be quite useless for the Polish Government in London to order the Poles in Poland to submit even for the time being. The Poles at home would rise against the Russians as they rose in 1863, however hopeless the prospects of such a rising might be, and however savage the reprisals to which it might lead.

5. Poles in London draw attention to the changing nature of the Russian attitude towards them. This was relatively accommodating when General Sikorski visited Moscow at the end of 1941 and the Russian army was in grave danger, but it has become much less friendly in proportion as the Russian armies have been successful in the field. M. Grabski gave as an instance of this change

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