

found that their position was an impossible one, and that they withdrew across the river after some fighting in which they got the worst of it. But we may still wonder why such a raid was undertaken with a force that must necessarily have been small. The temptation to attack Mackensen in the rear would naturally be a strong one, or it may be that the raid was intended to draw Teuton forces from the west, around Hermannstadt, where also the Roumanians were getting the worst of it. But in any case the engagement was not an important one.

We may suspect that there is still another exaggeration in the reports of the Roumanian defeat around Hermannstadt. Once more we are told that the defeat was decisive, that the Roumanian armies were dispersed, and that their shattered remnants were seeking to hide themselves in the mountains. And yet the number of prisoners claimed by the Teuton bulletins is only 3,000, and almost at once we read of some small counter success won by this same defeated and dispersed army. When Hindenburg defeated the Russians in East Prussia we read of 100,000 prisoners. A haul of 3,000 prisoners was hardly considered worth mentioning during the great Russian retreat last year. While Brussiloff was advancing through Galicia a few weeks ago he was in the daily habit of taking 3,000 prisoners before lunch. But neither Germans nor Russians talked in the inflated style of the present bulletins, a style that may be supposed to reflect the critical nature of the phase upon which the struggle as a whole has now entered. But as a matter of fact there has been no important battle since Roumania entered the war. The Dobrudja fighting may at any moment become of vital importance, but it has not done so yet. Neither side has won any success that has real strategic value. And we may believe that the Germans can not put a sufficient number of men into the eastern field to strike a blow that shall actually advance their campaign. They win successes almost wherever they have a chance to strike, but the successes lead nowhere. They win through an emergency at one place only to find that they must meet some other emergency elsewhere, and that the real fruit is always unattainable. It is not humanly possible to guard eighteen hundred miles of line, and with diminishing resources, against a combination of enemies whose resources are increasing. The man defending himself against a swarm of bees may kill a foe at every stroke, but it avails him nothing.

Roumania can hardly expect any other help than Russia is able to give her. It seems highly unlikely that the Allies in Greece will be able to do more for her than to effect a diversion in the south that will keep employed as many Bulgarians as possible. Certainly there can be no juncture between the Roumanians and the French and British within any measurable time. The question is frequently asked, why the Allies in the south remain inactive, why we do not hear of a great northward movement to reconquer Serbia and to over-run Bulgaria. The answer is that the Allies in the south are not remaining inactive, and that they are actually moving northward along two lines, and also in the direction of Monastir. But the movement is necessarily slow. There are practically no railroads in Macedonia, while much of the country is a maze of defiles and gorges that are heavily fortified and easy to defend. No doubt it would hasten the advance if Greece should finally decide to come into the war, since the Allies would then feel secure as to their rear. But they do not seem anxious for the practical co-operation of Greece, who is in the unpleasant position of asking for bids and receiving none. There was a time when Greece had something to trade with, but a country that is in a state of revolution can hardly be said to be politically solvent. The aid of Greece would certainly have its value, but evidently the value is not high enough to be worth bargaining for. The Allies in the south can do nothing for Roumania in the way of direct co-operation. All that they can do is to make such advances as shall hold the Bulgarian armies in Macedonia, and they seem to be doing this effectively, if we may judge from the steady advance upon Monastir and the equally steady pressure to the north that is being exercised by the whole line.

The Allied front in Greece is now about 150 miles in length. It extends from Florina, south of Monastir, to Neohori, on the Gulf of Orfano, and it is nearly a straight line with a slight northern curve. The most northerly point of this curve is Doiran, which was taken by the Allies some weeks ago. On the extreme left of the line are the Serbians, who are attacking Monastir and who seem likely to take it. The Allies are advancing northward along the Vardar River, and they have also crossed the Struma River to the east. As has been said, their advance is very slow, but it has been almost unchecked every-

where, the Bulgarians falling back at every point of contact. The Bulgarians have lost very heavily to the Serbians, and it is evident that they have insufficient men to cope with the French and British in the south and also with the Russians and Roumanians in the north. Probably Bulgaria has been called upon to furnish every man that she can spare to Falkenhayn and Mackensen, whose armies must contain a maximum of Bulgarians and Turks and a minimum of Germans and Austrians.

For such reasons we are hardly likely to see a very rapid unravelling of the Balkan knot, unless Mackensen should be seriously worsted in the Dobrudja. Certainly the Teutons will spare no effort to aid him in maintaining his position there, while Falkenhayn harries the Roumanians in the north. It looks much as though Roumania either entered the war before she was ready or else that she had attempted to strike at too many points at the same time. The temptation to wound Hungary was probably an irresistible one, and of course it was in consonance with the general plan to crush Austria as the weakest member of the Teuton alliance. It is easy to be wise after the event, but it seems as though Mackensen's invasion of the Dobrudja should have been foreseen and that the road for the Russian movement southward should have been kept open at all hazards. It is now evident enough that Germany regards the Balkans as the centre of the war and that she will strain every nerve to prove that she can protect her smaller allies and maintain her hold upon the railroad to the Far East. At the same time she has done no more than embarrass the movements of her enemies and win small battles that leave the general campaign delayed, but otherwise unaffected. She is a long way still from crushing Roumania, and we may doubt if she has enough men or can get enough men to do this without a dangerous weakening of her forces elsewhere. If she should strike a heavy blow anywhere on the Roumanian frontier it will be at the cost of the Bulgarian armies in the south, and in that case we shall find that Sarrail will be able to quicken his movements. The Balkan situation is very much like the whole war in miniature. A German victory at one point is likely to mean a German defeat at another.

The German armies in the Balkans can not be reinforced from the west without serious consequences. Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, writing from the British front and with official approval, gives the German strength in the west as 119 divisions, and General Fonville, writing in the *Revue de Paris*, makes the same estimation. These are practically the same as the estimates made five months ago, that is to say, before the assault on the Somme.

Assuming them to be correct—and the figures are not difficult to obtain—it is evident that Germany has done no more than replace her losses. Now the Germans on the Somme have been steadily falling back, and it is evident that if their numbers should be decreased they must fall back still faster. That Germany has been so quick and so ready to take up the gage in the Balkans is evidence that she is willing to continue her retirement in the west and that her forces in the Balkans are of more importance there than they would be in the west. We do not know how many men Germany is actually employing in the Balkans. Probably the number is not great, but it is significant that she should be willing to keep any men at all there at the obvious expense of the west. This seems to confirm the view already expressed that the Germans are fighting rear-guard actions in the west, that they intend to take up a wholly new line there, and that they are employing delaying tactics while that new line is being prepared and strengthened. For unless the Germans are retiring voluntarily we must suppose that their powers of resistance and their morale have been lessened. There is certainly no comparison between their fighting on the Somme and before Verdun.

That there must be a general retirement of the German line is an absolute certainty unless the Allied advance should be stopped, which seems impossible. Both Peronne and Bapaume are well to the east of the main line running north and south, and that line cannot remain where it is with enemy forces to its east. It is no longer a question whether there will be a retirement. The only question is its extent. Will it be local or will it be general? In other words, will it be judged sufficient to straighten out the Noyon angle and to make a new line that will stretch from Arras to Craonne, or will the retirement be still more general, say up to the Belgian frontier? There is no doubt that the German authorities have been preparing their public for just such a move as this. They have officially stated that worthless positions will not be defended at an undue cost of life—and of course all abandoned positions are worthless—and that the Allies can have as much territory as they wish at the price that they have already been paying. But whether they could actually and openly retire their main lines and evacuate miles of trenches without damaging attack remains to be seen. It would be an operation of great difficulty. It would give an opportunity for the use of the Allied cavalry which has hardly yet been in action at all. We may be sure that these are among the questions that are being gravely debated by general staff that would naturally like to cover such a movement by some brilliant victory in the east.

India's Offering to the Empire

By HIMALAYA

"IT is because India now sees the nations of the west struggling in the grip of their own matter-mad-civilization that she realizes what she has to give to the world, and knows that in order to give it she must be understood as she has not been in the past," writes Harendranath Maitra, in a new book, "Hinduism—The World-ideal."

India has been contemptuously named a land of "dreamers" by the motor-loving, sewing-machine-using civilization of America and Europe. But "there was once a dreamer by the name of Joseph, whose brothers said, 'Here comes the dreamer; let us sell him into Egypt.' They sold him into Egypt. When famine came to the land and the brothers went down into Egypt to buy corn, there they found Joseph and he had the corn. India has the spiritual corn."

The Hindus have developed a system of thought which, if accepted, would vitally help the world. Such is Mr. Maitra's contention as presented in this interesting volume from the press of Dodd, Mead & Company. Other Orientalists have uncovered Hindu philosophy for English readers, but none more intelligibly and with less of the usually perplexing Indian subtlety, than Mr. Maitra, of whom G. K. Chesterton, in an introduction, says: "His enthusiasm is for the human side of Hinduism, which touches the heart and makes the lofty ideals of the Vedas a practical religion and poetry for the common people."

The Hindu in his search for God passes through four stages of Ashrama life, as disciple, householder, meditator, and idealist. The first three stages are naturally only preliminary to the fourth, in which "his religion has developed into God-vision. He communes with Him day and night. He serves the

sick, consoles the bereaved. He weeps with those who weep, rejoices with those who rejoice. In the service of others he rejoices himself, and becomes the master of his country and the maker of his destiny. He is more than Brahmin."

ALL this is very beautiful and in marked contrast to the map of life followed by the men and the women of the West. India has a vision of the "Oneness of all Humanity," which Mr. Maitra thinks should be understood by her brother races.

God, the all-pervading spirit, is brought very near to the human understanding by the Hindu teaching. In Hinduism there is a "conception of God in all the human relations of life. Christianity has the conception of God as Father. To Islam, God is the Great Friend. But why should God be conceived of in only one relationship? Do they not all belong to Him? The Hindu worships God in every relation." Again, "If God were an Abstract God, He could have little to do with humanity. If God were Abstract God, Creation would be impossible. It is because God is Love that He 'willed Creation to be'; for 'Love must ever give; by its own law of love it must create new objects for its love, and this the Universe was formed, the human Heart of God.' From God who is Love has Creation come, and all Creation is ever seeking the Home from whence it came. Through the devotion of the heart, the devotee becomes one with the Beloved; yet is there ever a union beyond union, a joy beyond joy, a love beyond love, in the Infinite Heart."

It is, as I have said, all very beautiful, and as one turns thoughtfully the pages of Mr. Maitra's book, he would fain throw off his credal religion and accept the spiritual offering of the East. And then