

5. In determining our attitude to these new developments I think we must bear in mind first that time is running out for the U.N. in as much as no new funds have been or are likely to be authorized for the Congo operation beyond 1962 and, secondly, that it would be a very severe blow to the prestige and future usefulness of the Organization were it to fail in the Congo or to suffer a military defeat at the hands of the Katanga gendarmerie.

6. Canada's contribution to the UN military operation consists of approximately 320 men. The bulk of these (276) are army signal troops who operate the UN forces communications network, and the rest are staff and air personnel. At the moment there are approximately 40 Canadian personnel in Katanga. Because of their key role in the field of communications, administration, air control and logistics and the fact that it would be very difficult for the UN to replace them from politically acceptable countries, a decision to restrict their use in Katanga could jeopardize the whole UN operation at a crucial moment. Also any weakening of support from Canada and the other Western countries at this time would make it more difficult for the Acting Secretary-General to resist the offer of troops from certain countries who are prepared to use force against Katanga.

7. U Thant has also raised the question of seeking a new mandate from the Security Council. It would seem preferable to avoid this because the Council might fail to reach a decision; and the Soviet Union might seize the opportunity to attack the whole reconciliation plan and possibly U Thant himself. A further deployment of U.N. troops in Katanga could be justified under the existing mandate on the basis of their right of freedom of movement and their duty, if requested, to protect the European population in the mining towns.

Recommendations

8. In view of the foregoing I have the honour to recommend that the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations be authorized to indicate in the Congo Advisory Committee that the Canadian Government:

(a) approves the new approach to the Union Minière to pay taxes and fees lawfully due to the Central Government.

(b) accepts the risks involved without placing restriction on the normal use of Canadian personnel should U.N. troops within the terms of the existing mandate be called upon to protect the installations and communications of Union Minière.

(c) is not in favour of seeking a new mandate from the Security Council at this time.

H.C. GREEN

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PCO

Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet

Extract from Cabinet Conclusions

SECRET

[Ottawa], October 30, 1962

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) in the Chair,
 The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Green),
 The Minister of Justice (Mr. Fleming),
 The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Hees),
 The Minister of Transport (Mr. Balcer),
 The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Churchill),
 The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Fulton),
 The Minister of Finance (Mr. Nowlan),