

themselves excluding an arrangement with the North Atlantic Powers the exclusion would not extend to their overseas territories such as Greenland. (I am reporting more fully on the State Department's talks with the Norwegian Foreign Minister in a separate message.†)

2. Mr. Van Kleffens said that it would be necessary that the Senators' desire to go slowly should be balanced against the opportunity slowness gave for the opponents of [the] Treaty to gain adherents. On the matter of language he was quite willing to try to find more dispassionate forms of expression but emphasized that he would not like to see the general framework materially weakened. In relation to the Norwegian situation he pointed out that the world now knows we have made approaches to Norway and Denmark. Should either or both of them decide not to take part the U.S.S.R. would represent that as their victory and our defeat. He did not think that too much importance should be attached to splitting Scandinavia as their ties are probably strong enough to survive a division of this sort. He posed a military question for the meeting. He asked whether it would be better to have an independent Scandinavian block which would join the west in an emergency, or to have Norway and Denmark join the west now. In other words, did the value of a united Scandinavia outweigh the value of being able to concert plans with part of Scandinavia before an emergency should arise?

3. Mr. Bonnet urged the need not to lose time and said that the language of Article 5 did not look very strong to those who were used to treaties of this nature.

4. Sir Oliver Franks expressed sympathy with the Senators' need for time to consider but emphasized that press speculation and the recent activities of the U.S.S.R. make some sort of positive result necessary. Lack of action will appear to the world to be a defeat. On the point of language he did not agree with Mr. Acheson that everybody understood what was to happen under Article 5. He thought that it was most important that the language of the Articles should reassure the public. While conceding the radical nature of the step being taken by the United States and Canada, he pressed for consideration of the effect of the Treaty both in Western and in Eastern Europe. People in Europe look on this Treaty as the coping-stone of the economic efforts made in Europe by the United States. If this Treaty was to establish some working arrangement for peace in the next generation it should assure people of what is meant. He did not think that it was wise to avoid mentioning the possibility of military action: a sober mention of that possibility would have a very beneficent effect in Europe. He was afraid that understatement in the language of the Treaty might cause the Treaty to fail in its object of showing the world where we stand. On the subject of Scandinavia he did not attach much importance to splitting Sweden from the other two. The United Kingdom attached great importance to the inclusion of Norway. He granted that if we could make a separate arrangement over Greenland that would make some difference to the outlook but it would not be overwhelming. He did not think that Scandinavia could form a very strong alliance of its own. While Norwegian participation might lead the Russians to move troops into Finland it would be unlikely to lead to the invasion of Norway and he, therefore, still favoured the inclusion of Norway and Denmark.