

As Canadians, our energies are deeply devoted to the security of the Western community, on this continent and in Europe. But our loyalties, our national and global interests, by no means end there.

Canada's place on the Pacific Rim gives us a privileged relationship with Japan, with China, and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and, of course, with Australia and New Zealand. Our extensive program of development assistance takes us to many parts of the world, remote in distance, but close in partnership. Our standing in the community of francophone nations, and in the Commonwealth, demands that we share the full range of political, economic and security concerns to which our national character gives us access.

That is why, in pursuing an initiative to improve the prospects for peace, I determined from the start that our approach must be global in scope and in perspective. Such an approach is dictated by the complex interlinkage of disarmament and development; of superpower animosity and Third World rivalries; of the resort to force and the availability of weapons; of nuclear balances in Europe and in Asia.

One man representing one country cannot promise a miracle, let alone deliver one. I have absolutely no illusions about the complexity of the issues in play. Nonetheless it is essential, in my judgment, to seek stability at a number of points along the downward trend-line, and to recognize that peace and security in the modern age are indivisible.

Moreover, I am not alone. Other leaders have joined their concerns with mine. There is a growing community of political leadership which is determined to subject the science of arms to the art of politics. I draw encouragement from the support of that community.

You will know that I have just returned from meetings in Europe with several leaders of the Atlantic Alliance, with His Holiness the Pope, and with Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands. I return from Europe with clear expressions of support for my initiative, confident that my sense of urgency is shared by our friends and allies. I found a particular consensus of the need to lay down a third rail of confidence and communication — a rail charging our dealings with the other side with a current of political energy.

I took to my European colleagues for discussions, and for refinement in light of their own views, elements of a program for political management of the current crisis. I return with the assurance of their personal attention to this program. Let me set out some of the elements.

The first is the need to establish, as soon as possible in the course of the coming year, a forum in which global limits might be negotiated for all five nuclear-weapons states. This proposal is without prejudice to the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] or START [Strategic Arms Reductions Talks] talks between the USA and USSR. But those talks, and rightly so, do not cover British, French or Chinese nuclear forces.

What we must seek to provide is a negotiating forum for those five states which recognizes the right of the United States and the Soviet Union as strategic equals — what a recent Trilateral Commission report calls "inevitable parity" between them — and which provides a mutually acceptable and stable