

Government. I scarcely need to tell you, in his home province, of his long and excellent service to Canada in previous years and of the significant contribution he is making now and which the Canadian Government knows he is prepared to continue to make in the field of Asian policy.

We have also explored with our Commission colleagues India and Poland the possibility of a useful role for the Commission in bringing the opposing parties closer together. Our efforts have not yet borne full fruit. Despite this, we intend to continue - either alone, or as a member of the Commission, or with other countries - our efforts to bring about peace talks and to find a path which may lead us out of this increasingly dangerous situation. Indeed, I feel that we have an obligation to continue to make every effort possible towards a settlement.

We are often urged to "demand" this or "insist upon" that with respect to some hypothetical solution of the conflict. I think we must recognize that to proceed along these lines is unlikely to be productive. Those who call for dramatic action on Canada's part, in the apparent expectation that we could help bring about some quick solution to the Vietnam conflict, either provide little analysis of the main trends in Asian affairs or they make assertions about these trends which scarcely fit the facts as we know them.

I think it important, in explaining the policies of the Government in these matters, to give some indication of how we view the developments in Vietnam and in Asia generally.

There is some danger that, faced with the constantly increasing scale of hostilities in Vietnam, and with the complexities of internal affairs in South Vietnam, we might conclude that the situation there is quite unique, that it has been created only by miscalculation or overwhelming ambition on one side or the other in one limited area and that a simple solution could be found regardless of developments elsewhere. We must, however, relate certain aspects of the situation in Vietnam to the problems of Asia as a whole - the lessons to be drawn from the unhappy situation must be placed in a broader perspective.

There are several characteristics of the Vietnamese problem which are common to other parts of Asia and, indeed, in some cases, to other parts of the world. It is, for example, a partitioned state, a victim of what has been called "this century's awkward form of compromise". The Seventeenth Parallel in Vietnam is certainly not the only one which has produced international crises. What has happened there provides further confirmation of the risks inherent in any attempt to remove agreed dividing lines by force, whether this force is manifested in open aggression or by subversion and infiltration. We can only work towards some realistic and relatively stable settlement comparable to those which have had to be accepted elsewhere.

The indirect methods of the Vietnamese war are a manifestation of the Communist doctrine of "wars of national liberation" so vividly described by Marshal Lin Piao last September. A future such as that envisaged by Lin Piao, consisting of a series of "liberation wars" supported by China, obviously will not bring about the stability and security which the states of Asia so desperately need. There are disquieting signs of developments elsewhere which point up the continuing danger of eruptions such as we now face in Vietnam.