

I think we all felt before we went to Lisbon that there was a very real danger of the European Defence Community developing a separate existence from NATO itself, if and when the Community was set up; and I think most of us felt that it would be disastrous to get away from the Atlantic concept even to achieve such a desirable objective as a European army. This resolution was to guard against the danger of that development. More important even than that, I think, was our agreement that each of the organizations should give reciprocal security undertakings to the other, so that by virtue of these undertakings the whole area of both organizations would be covered by a security guarantee.

The significance of this, if it is carried into effect, if the legislatures of the countries concerned agree, including the Canadian legislature, is that the area of guarantee will cover Western Germany--that is to say if the Defence Community comes into being and if in the treaty establishing that organization there is a reciprocal guarantee on the part of that European Defence Community covering our present NATO territory. I do not think it is easy to exaggerate the importance of that decision. So far as guarantees and security are concerned it does bring Western Germany into very close association with NATO.

Then finally under this heading we agreed on a procedure by which there can be joint meetings of both organizations, a matter which caused a good deal of difference of opinion in the six months or so before the Lisbon meeting. These joint meetings can be called on the initiative of either organization and indeed, in certain circumstances, they can be called on the initiative of any one member of either organization.

I think all this is of very considerable importance in the development not only of European unity but of the North Atlantic concept; but none of these decisions can take effect until the treaty establishing the European Defence Community is ratified. I think we might reserve our most enthusiastic plaudits against that day, because there are obvious difficulties in the way of such legislative action, difficulties in Bonn, difficulties in Paris, and possibly difficulties in other capitals. In Bonn we know what those difficulties are: the German insistence that in the substitution of a peace contract for the occupation statute there should be a recognition of their equality of status with other members of the European Community; the German insistence on unity between East and West, with all that implies in terms of boundaries and other things. ...

Even under the draft treaty which is now being discussed with a view to the setting up of a European Defence Community there is no provisions which would obligate any member of the Community or any member of any North Atlantic Treaty Organization associated with the European Community to go to the help of any country which takes any offensive or aggressive action of any kind. It is purely defensive in character; the reciprocal undertaking is to help each other if attacked, and on no other occasion.

This question of Germany, which loomed so large in our minds at Lisbon and must continue to loom large in our minds in all the free countries, is very difficult, complicated and indeed explosive. There are two extreme trends which