

of the Charter now incorporated in Article 24(3) which requires the Security Council to report periodically to the General Assembly. The purpose was to give the Assembly some sense of supervision of the Council's acts, although it has not turned out that way. On all these issues Canada pursued policies which were consistent with her wartime record and her post-war position as a leader of the secondary powers.

In subsequent years, Canada continued to look for and to follow policies which satisfied these general capacities and needs. We fully expected to play our proper part in the building of the collective security system sketched in Chapter VII of the Charter and we were alarmed and disappointed by the early signs of disunity in the Security Council and by the breakdown in 1947 of negotiations between the Permanent Members of the Council on the question of U.N. armed forces. We were obliged to turn elsewhere for the satisfaction of our security requirements. Yet even as we ratified the NATO Treaty in 1949 we did not despair of the U.N.'s capacity to fulfill its primary purpose. The present Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Lester Pearson, said in Parliament at the time, for example, that "the North Atlantic Treaty will serve as an instrument which...will make it possible for (the free democracies) to use the U.N. with greater confidence and more hope of success."

The U.N. action in Korea was an apparent fulfillment of these hopes. Canada regarded it as the first effective attempt by the U.N. to organize an international force to stop aggression. We had contributed for the first time to a U.N. peacekeeping operation when military observers were sent to Kashmir in January 1949. We had also supported the Secretary-General's proposal for a U.N. Field Service. But it was not until 1950 and the opportunities provided by the decision to resist aggression in Korea that we began to organize the procedures and to think in the terms which we have followed since.